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Abstract
The stochastic volatility of daily foreign exchange (FX) derivatives poses a number of risks for
the international banking community. Settlement risk, liquidity risk and capital adequacy are
just a few immediate concerns that arise from such volatility. This thesis examines the impact
of close-out netting on minimising the stochastic volatility of inter-bank FX derivatives. The
problem with close-out netting is that although it is a simple formula of taking the differences
between two banks at one point in time, it is the stochastic and volatile nature of FX rates that
makes measuring the full impact of netting difficult.
The objective of this thesis is to establish a realistic international banking framework or mod-
elling environment in which close-out netting can be scientifically applied and examined. Five
international daily FX rates will be used as sufficient approximations for five international banks.
A generalised autoregressive conditionally heteroschedastic (GARCH) modelling approach is
adopted as a robust and rich FX volatility paradigm. Then through Monte Carlo simulation of
the resulting fitted GARCH models, we generate the distributions -with and without close-out
netting. Through statistical techniques, we estimate the impact FX volatility due to close-out
netting.
The findings of this thesis are interesting, showing that close-out netting is far more than just a
simple mathematical process. Netting surely does reduce each bank’s exposure to FX volatility,
however, its multivariate nature reveals some important results for banking risk research and
bank analysts. These include; (1) Some banks have little or no impact due to close-out netting
(2) one “minimally leveraged” bank may reduce their exposure down to zero (3) some banks
may be worse off under netting due to there being a ‘risk transfer’ by certain banks (4) some
of the resulting distributions are non-standard, highlighting the underlying mechanism of this
multivariate process. These results answer many questions about close-out netting and raise
new questions for further research that is beyond the scope of this thesis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis examines the underlying nature of netting on bank portfolios. Netting is the process
in which two business entities that owe each other money, agree to offset their amounts and
record just the difference. For example, if Bank A owes Bank B $100,000 and Bank B owes
Bank A $20,000, one can effectively net the amounts and record that Bank A owes Bank B
$80,000 and Bank B owes Bank A $0. The focus in this thesis is on examining specifically
‘close-out’ netting as opposed to the other two forms of netting; Payment/Settlement Netting
and Novation Netting. Payment/Settlement Netting is the process of settling all deals between
two counterparties on a net basis (Corrigan, et. al., 1999). Novation Netting is the process of
replacing a set of obligations involving gross payments/deliveries with another set of obligations
providing for net payment/delivery (Corrigan, et. al., 1999). In Close-out Netting, business en-
tities enter a stringent legal agreement where they record their exposures (or amounts of money
lent that are exposed to credit default risk) as if either business entity was bankrupt. This
means that they are legally required to guarantee that at least the net amount will be available
to the appropriate entity.
This thesis will also focus on banks as the main type of business entities. This is because
banks were the first business entities to adopt close-out netting in a large scale, and so their
practice and corresponding literature is the most extensive. As such we will examine netting
within the framework of the Basel II Accord of international bank regulations (Basel Commit-
tee, 2001). The topic is financial in nature, and can be considered with either a predominantly
qualitative perspective, by focusing on the legal and accounting aspects, or take a predominantly
quantitative perspective, by focusing on the economics and financial econometrics aspects. This
thesis will address the topic through a balanced approach.
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The major reason why international banks become bankrupt is due to the volatility of interest
and foreign exchange (FX) rates, and their impact on financial instruments. We will examine
this phenomenon by simulating the stochastic volatility of FX rates for various arrangements of
banks. We will simulate first for two banks, then three, and then generalise to multiple banks.
By simulation, we mean Monte Carlo (MC) Simulation, in which suitably distributed random
numbers are passed into the netting model to determine the behaviour of the model and how
it effects the outcomes. Conversely, this approach also estimates the sensitivity of the netting
model to sudden changes in the input numbers. By doing so, we can address the question of
‘How much does netting reduce the risk of sudden changes in FX rates’? The way in which
the distributions of these numbers will be controlled and analysed will be through the widely
accepted Generalised Auto Regressive Conditionally Heteroschedastic (GARCH) methodology.
Although we will not delve too deep into GARCH, we will be able to leverage some of its features
that will help assess the nature of close-out netting in a realistic financial framework.
The reason why close-out netting is being examined here is that there has been little previ-
ous research in this area, despite its benefits (Fermanian and Scaillet, 2003). Such benefits arise
due to close-out netting minimising the amount of money that is exposed to another business
entity. As a result, less regulatory capital for capital adequacy is required, which can be released
for reinvestment activities. It will thus be very beneficial to research the underlying nature of
close-out netting to help measure or estimate its benefits. At the heart of these issues, there is
a central question which is stated separately below.
Research Question
The question that this thesis aims at answering can be expressed as “What is the Underlying
Nature and Mechanics of Close-out Netting?”
The stochastic volatility of daily foreign exchange (FX) derivatives poses a number of risks
for the international banking community. Settlement risk, liquidity risk and capital adequacy
are just a few immediate concerns that arise from such volatility.
This thesis examines the impact of close-out netting on minimising the stochastic volatility
of inter-bank FX derivatives. The problem with close-out netting is that although it is a simple
formula of taking the differences between two banks at one point in time, it is the stochastic
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and volatile nature of FX rates that makes measuring the full impact of netting difficult.
The objective of this thesis is to establish a realistic international banking framework or mod-
elling environment in which close-out netting can be scientifically applied and examined. Five
international daily FX rates will be used as sufficient approximations for five international banks.
A generalised autoregressive conditionally heteroschedastic (GARCH) modelling approach is
adopted as a robust and rich FX volatility paradigm. Then through Monte Carlo simulation of
the resulting fitted GARCH models, we generate the distributions -with and without close-out
netting. Through statistical techniques, we estimate the impact FX volatility due to close-out
netting.
Having introduced what, how and why the netting research has been carried out, we can now
define each of the core concepts separately.
1.1 Close-out Netting
Close-out netting is a risk minimisation technique that applies mainly to the lending and bor-
rowing of large sums of money between banks (i.e. bank counterparties). Netting can also
be utilised by large corporates and multinational financial institutions due to their large mon-
etary reserves. The following defines close-out netting as per the Australian Netting Act of 1998.
Definition 1 (Close-out Netting)
For close-out netting to occur, the following requirements are to be satisfied (“Netting Act”,
1998);
(a). Parties close-out (or formally terminate) each transaction existing between them before
the scheduled maturity date by determining a present value to each transaction Mark-
to-Market (MtM) 1; and
(b). Each transaction is aggregated into a single net amount and transactions that are “In-
The-Money” 2 are netted against transactions that are “Out-Of-The-Money” 3 to arrive
at an overall single sum.
Whilst this definition of close-out netting is the Australian definition, it does not contain any
1MtM will be defined in Section 1.2.
2In-The-Money will be defined in Section 1.2. under MtM
3Out-Of-The-Money will be defined in Section 1.2. under MtM
3
features that distinguish any Australian-specific regulations. In fact, although there is general
legal consensus in various jurisdictions around the world that close-out netting is effective pre-
insolvency, there is no such general consensus post-insolvency. This means that whilst netting
is perfectly fine from an Accounting perspective, for it to be fully effective, the assets netted
need to be securitised. Securitisation will be defined formally below but essentially it allows
these assets to act as security in case of a credit default event. It is because of this ambiguity
that before a close-out netting contract can be entered into, each counterparty’s 4 legal repre-
sentatives must ensure that all relevant documents are accurately submitted and are “in order”
(APRA, 2000). This means that this Australian definition is generic enough to be applied to
other countries legal context without loss of generality or cause of ambiguity.
Such a contractual arrangement has arisen due to many countries law courts wanting to eliminate
the ambiguity that liquidators in a receivership can use to their clients advantage. Liquidators
achieve this by choosing to claim on contracts that are in their clients favour, i.e. In-The-
Money, but not on those not in their favour, i.e. Out-of-The-Money. This is referred to as
“cherry picking” and has been phased out under close-out netting agreements (ISDA, 1999).
Counterparties agreeing to close-out netting terms and conditions are able to mutually enjoy
amongst other benefits, lower risks by knowing upfront each counterparty’s total exposure to
one another and consequently are also better able to manage their ongoing capital allocation
and capital adequacy requirements (Basel Committee, 2001). However, there are disadvantages
associated with close-out netting that the legal literature surprisingly doesn’t capture. These
issues are documented in Chapter 2 - Literature Review.
It is worthwhile clarifying that close-out netting involves finding the net difference between
the two counterparties, but not in finding a counterparty for a matching amount. For example,
if Bank A has written a $10,000 contract with Bank B, then one needs to ask “How much money
does Bank B owe Bank A?”, or equivalently “What exposure does Bank B have with Bank A?”,
but not “Which Bank owes Bank A $10,000 so that this can be netted off?”.
Another point worth noting is that a bank is not so much concerned about situations where it
cannot pay back a counterparty, but more if a counterparty cannot pay back the bank itself.
Although such a stance for a bank to its counterparties may appear to increase the likelihood of
credit defaults to their counterparties, close-out netting actually decreases this particular like-
4A counterparty is the business entity that one has an exposure to and is also known as an obligor or creditor.
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lihood. This is achieved by recording wholesale transactions with close-out netting factored in,
resulting in the net amounts being reconciled. Because amounts lent and borrowed are combined
in this manner, exposures are always positive (i.e. greater than $0), and are recorded against
the counterparty with the greatest exposure to the other.
It is possible that the simplicity behind close-out netting has lead researchers to believe that
there is not much that can be progressed in close-out netting and hence the scarcity of research
in this area. Another reason why there are very few quantitative studies on the impact of close-
out netting is due to its relatively recent implementation, and that it is a strategy that is mainly
used commercially. As mentioned above, this thesis will focus on close-out netting rather than
the other forms of netting. This is because it is the most recently introduced form of netting
and also because it refers to credit defaults and hence credit risk analysis.
1.2 Other Definitions
Definition 2 (Mark to Market [MtM])
Mark to Market (MtM) is a measure of the replacement cost of contracts in the market. It
assesses the In- or Out-of-The-Money position of a contract and when the measure is;
(a). Positive or In-The-Money, the counterparty has credit exposure against the bank.; and
(b). Negative or Out-of-The-Money, the bank has credit exposure to the counterparty.
(Holton, 2001).
The methodology or approach that this thesis will take in modelling netting’s impacts will
be through simulation. In particular, MC Simulation will be adopted as opposed to other forms
of simulation.
Definition 3 (Monte Carlo (MC) Simulation)
A method of generating values from a known distribution for the purposes of experimentation.
This is typically accomplished by generating uniform random variables and using them in an
inverse reliability equation to produce failure times that would conform to the desired input dis-
tribution Chinarel Knowledgebase, 2005).
Yet another definition of MC simulation is,
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A technique used in computer simulations that uses sampling from a random number sequence
to simulate characteristics or events or outcomes with multiple possible values. For example,
this can be used to represent or model many individual patients in a population with ranges of
values for certain health characteristics or outcomes. In some cases, the random components
are added to the values of a known input variable for the purpose of determining the effects of
fluctuations of this variable on the values of the output variable (NICHSR, 2005).
Finally, the other main concept that needs to be defined is stochastic processes, as they de-
scribe the nature of FX rates and their volatility.
Definition 4 (Stochastic Processes)
In the mathematics of probability, a stochastic process is a random function. In the most com-
mon applications, the domain over which the function is defined is a time interval (a stochastic
process of this kind is called a “time series” in its applications) or a region of space (a stochastic
process being called a random field). Familiar examples of time series include stock market and
FX rate fluctuations, signals such as speech, audio and video; medical data such as a patient’s
EKG, EEG, blood pressure or temperature; and random movement such as Brownian motion
or random walks. Examples of random fields include static images, random topographies (land-
scapes), or composition variations of an inhomogeneous material (Wikipedia Knowledgebase,
2006).
We can now outline the remaining structure of the thesis.
1.3 Thesis Structure
The remaining chapters build on this introduction by providing progressive levels of detail whilst
narrowing our focus on the impacts of close-out netting. The rest of this thesis is organised as
follows.
Chapter 2 - Literature Review
This chapter reviews the literature behind close-out netting by examining the Institutional and
Historical Framework of Netting, Netting Legislation, Credit Risk Models and finally Netting
Research. It provides a context for the research, how this thesis relates to other research, and
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highlights that there is little quantitative research on close-out netting.
Chapter 3 - Modelling Methodology
This chapter explains how the data was selected and captured so that it could be modelled for FX
rate volatility. It then describes the Generalised Auto-Regressive Conditionally Heteroschedas-
tic (GARCH) methodology to generate volatile credit exposures that are netted by the netting
methodology. Finally, the Monte Carlo simulation methodology is discussed to obtain sufficient
scenarios of the netted GARCH exposures. It also generalises these results through the use of
more theoretical analyses.
Chapter 4 - Modelling Results
This chapter lists the results and analyses their characteristics in detail. These include FX rate
time series data, GARCH models, MC GARCH simulations, applications of the netting model.
These sections all undertake distributional analysis to validate that the results are not incorrect.
Chapter 5 - Conclusions
This chapter concludes the research by summarising the results, relating the results back to the
original research question. The results are presented objectively to minimise missinterpretation.
It also proposes other related aspects of research that are outside the scope of this thesis, yet
still worthwhile addressing.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
The netting literature is important as it gives context and forms a foundation for the rest of
the thesis. Finding literature on close-out netting is also difficult due to it being only relatively
recently introduced in Australia, in 2000, and only slightly earlier in other countries. The fact
that there is earlier literature on other forms of netting means that certain relevant articles and
papers have already been written, but under alternate names. Sometimes close-out netting is
labelled as “Netting Under Default”, and “Netting by Close-out”. Other times it will be trans-
lated into English as “Offsetting”, hence confusing the reader with the related yet inappropriate
“Offset Accounting”. Much of the literature on close-out netting is couched in a legal context
since fundamentally it is a legal concept that is defined and enforced by the law. This chapter
has been divided into “Institutional and Historical Framework of Netting”, “Netting Legisla-
tion”, “Credit Risk Models” and “Netting Research”.
2.1 Institutional and Historical Framework of Netting
We begin by detailing the volatile and risky nature of financial institutions so that later we can
see how and why netting is a process that can minimise the associated risks. These risks mainly
arise due to sudden fluctuations in FX rates and also in domestic and international interest rates.
Each day enormous amounts of money are transferred between financial institutions around the
world as settlement for FX transactions and interest rate derivatives/instruments. Owing to
time zones and technological limitations, parties to settlement transactions usually assume full
and unsecured risk with regard to counterparty exposure to settlement risk 1. A bank’s risk
1Settlement risk is defined below.
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exposure for each transaction often lasts for as long as 48 hours, sometimes entailing credit
risk against counterparties which exceeds the bank’s equity or capital (Allsopp Report, 1996).
Over the past 25 years, liberalisation and internationalisation of capital markets, combined with
advances in FX trading technology, have led to considerably stronger growth in FX trading
than implied by the growth in international trade in goods. According to an international sur-
vey carried out by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in 1998, daily FX trading had
reached an estimated USD $1,500 billion (BIS, 1998). FX transactions form the largest sector
of international finance, and so this thesis will restrict its focus to FX instruments and rates.
FX transactions involve the payment of the sold currency to a counterparty in return for receipt
of the bought currency from that counterparty. For example, when buying USD against JPY,
the trade is settled with a payment of JPY against receipt of USD. However, FX derivatives
are more complex than just the exchange of currency since they also involve margin calls, for-
eign and domestic interest rates. These are some of the reasons why sometimes banks or their
counterparties default on their settlement amounts, or even worse, through to being declared
bankrupt. FX transactions also give rise to various forms of risk and these types of risk include
Settlement, Market, Credit, Systemic and Operational risk. These are discussed below.
Settlement risk is also known as Liquidity, Payment or Herstadtt risk, and can be narrowly
defined as “the risk of loss when a bank in a FX transaction pays the currency it sold but does
not receive the currency it bought” (BIS, 2000 p1). A loss would constitute a bank or counter-
party delaying a payment or settlement amount. The consequences of this range from incurring
losses such as fines, through to a downgrade in credit risk rating (making it more expensive to
do business with that bank). This type of risk will be the main focus of this thesis, as it is the
most common type of risk in FX transactions. If this were to occur over an extended period of
time, it would then be classified as a default and hence pertain to credit risk.
Market risk is defined as “the risk of losses in On- and Off-balance sheet positions arising
from movements in market prices, including interest rates, FX rates and equity values” (BIS,
1996 p45). Market risk mainly involves relatively high probabilities that one will lose relatively
low amounts of money. In the long run, investment returns that are subject to predominantly
market risk exhibit a symmetrical normal distribution (Morris, 2000). From a more detailed
perspective, we observe that these financial returns exhibit leptokurtosis, i.e. a much higher
peak with “fat tails” than the normal distribution (Premaratne and Bera, 2005). A loss would
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constitute a reduction in the instrument’s price based on its demand.
Credit risk or credit default risk, is defined as “the exposure to uncertainty in a counter-
party’s ability to meet its obligations” (Marphatia and Tiwari, 2000 p7). Credit risk mainly
involves relatively low probabilities that one will lose relatively high amounts of money. In this
sense, credit risk is almost the exact opposite to its market risk counterpart. In the long run,
and from a high-level overview perspective, investments that are subject to predominantly credit
risk exhibit a right-skewed lognormal distribution (Morris, 2000). These distributions typically
display high kurtosis requiring more sophisticated techniques. These shall be discussed in the
next chapter via the GARCH methodology. A loss would constitute a counterparty not being
able to repay their debt.
System or systemic risk is defined as “the risk that the inability of one participant in a
payment system, or in a financial market, to meet its obligations when due will cause other
participants to fail to meet their obligations when due” (Marphatia and Tiwari, 2000 p7). A
loss by one bank could cause a cascading effect across multiple banks that did not necessarily
have any transactions with that original bank.
Operational risk is defined as “the risk of direct or indirect loss resulting from inadequate or
failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events” (BIS, 2001 p2). As an
example, a lack of adequate internal controls in a bank could lead to human errors not being
validated, through to fraudulent activities not being detected.
Since international banks typically have a low likelihood of having credit risk and indeed
bankruptcy, credit risk will not be modelled in this thesis, but we will survey the common
types of credit risk models. This was a further reason to focus on FX settlement risk. Another
reason was that changes in market risk often have flow on effects with settlement risk, so to
avoid multivariate or convoluted effects clouding the results, a clearer and simpler focus was
adopted. A more formal definition of FX settlement risk than the definition above was adopted
by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) and is set out as follows.
“A bank’s actual exposure -the amount at risk -when settling a FX trade
equals the full amount of the currency purchased and lasts from the time a
payment instruction for the currency sold can no longer be cancelled unilaterally
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until the time the currency purchased is received with finality” (Allsopp Report, 1996 p8).
As mentioned previously, FX settlement risk can be minimised by netting. It is thus important
to discuss the legal framework that supports netting activities.
2.2 Netting Legislation
Netting has had a dramatic impact on international banking law and indeed Australian law.
The list below details how for example the Australian “Netting Act” is to expressly override the
existing Australian law (Stumbles and Kerr, 1998). Although it is not the scope of this thesis to
delve too deep into the legal aspects of netting, the list below shows that many legal documents
have had to be modified to accommodate netting. A list of these Acts include; Section 11F
and 16 of the Banking Act, 1959; Section 187 of the Life Insurance Act, 1995; Section 86 of the
Reserve Bank Act, 1959; Sections 437D, 468 and the preference provisions in Division 2 of Part
5.7B of the Corporations Law; Sections 120, 121 and 122 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1966; Section
142 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Act, 1993. Despite netting’s many benefits
and changes to legal documents, there are certain disadvantages associated with netting that
the legal literature does not address in detail. These issues are introduced later in this chapter
under the section Netting Research.
Since netting significantly reduces the various forms of risk by minimising the amount of money
that is exposed, banks that utilise netting thus have less restrictive capital adequacy require-
ments, as provisioned by the international Basel II Accord (BIS, 2001). APRA and the federal
Reserve Bank of Australia are then responsible amongst other tasks for setting the guidelines
to calculate minimum regulatory capital reserves. Additional references on Australian specific
capital adequacy and capital allocation that have been affected by the “Netting Act” include
the following two key APRA documents.
The first of these documents on capital regulation is the Prudential Statement C1: Capital
Adequacy of Banks (APRA, 1999). The relevance of this is that all banks are required to hold a
certain minimum level of capital reserve in case they declare bankruptcy or they begin defaulting
on their credit obligations to their counterparties. The size of this capital reserve is mainly de-
pendant upon both the amount of the default, and the number of defaults. This capital reserve
is also dependant on the degree of financial backing of the bank, and on its credit rating.
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The second of these documents on capital regulation is the Prudential Statement E1: Supervi-
sion of Bank’s Large Credit Exposure (APRA, 1989). The relevance of this is due to the way in
which banks are more heavily regulated than multinational corporates and other financial insti-
tutions. This document details how APRA is required to work in conjunction with the federal
Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) to ensure that Australian banks meet their national and in-
ternational regulations. This has impacted banks by forcing them to have greater transparency
and disclosure in how they report large exposures as Current Liabilities on their Balance Sheets.
“The Basel II Accord” (BIS, 2001) is directed by the Basel Committee, which is the inter-
national equivalent of APRA for banking regulation and supervision. The “Report on Netting
Schemes” (Angell, 1989) is a primer on netting. It presents an analysis of the credit and liquid-
ity risks experienced by participants in bilateral and multilateral netting arrangements for both
interbank payment orders and forward-value contracts such as FX trades. The Report also looks
at the effects of netting on the integrity of interbank settlement arrangements, the conduct of
monetary policy, the complications posed for the allocation of supervisory responsibilities, and
the effective oversight of cross-border netting schemes.
One year later, BIS issued “Minimum standards for the design and operation of netting schemes”
(Lamfalussy, 1990). It introduced six standards for netting systems to adhere to, and these are:
1. Netting schemes should have a well-founded legal basis under all relevant jurisdictions.
2. Netting scheme participants should have a clear understanding of the impact of the par-
ticular scheme on each of the financial risks affected by the netting process.
3. Multilateral netting systems should have clearly defined procedures for the management
of credit risks and liquidity risks that specify the respective responsibilities of the netting
provider and the participants.
4. Multilateral netting systems should, at a minimum, be capable of ensuring the timely
completion of daily settlements in the event of an inability to settle by the participant
with the largest single net-debit position.
5. Multilateral netting systems should have objective and publicly-disclosed criteria for ad-
mission which permit fair and open access.
6. All netting schemes should ensure the operational reliability of technical systems and the
availability of back-up facilities capable of completing daily processing requirements.
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Further to these standards is the “Report of the Committee on Interbank Netting Schemes of
the Central Banks of the Group of Ten Countries” (BIS, 1990). The document analyses the
impact of netting on credit, liquidity and systemic risk and sets out the principles for central
bank oversight of cross-border and multi-currency netting and settlement schemes. Prior to
netting, exposure for each N assets for i ∈ {1, ..., N} in a portfolio (ANet) was approximated by
taking the weighted average of the underlying gross amounts (AGross)i giving,
ANet =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(AGross)i . (2.1)
To account for each M netted assets for j ∈ {1, ...,M} , an add-on was included in Equation
2.1 giving,
ANet =
w1
N
N∑
i=1
(AGross)i +
w2 ×NGR
M
M∑
j=1
(AGross)j , (2.2)
where w1 and w2 are weighting factors, and NGR is the current netted market or replace-
ment value divided by current grossed market or replacement value (BIS, 1995). Initially the
weights were set to w1 = 0.5 and w2 = 0.5 as the add-on component was a significant improve-
ment to the calculation. Later, the netting effect was found to have a more prominent impact,
and so the weights were set to w1 = 0.4 and w2 = 0.6.
An attempt to extend bilateral netting by taking into account the effects of multilateral net-
ting was then documented in “Interpretation of the Capital Accord for Multilateral Netting of
Forward Value Foreign Exchange Transactions” (BIS, 1996). It suggested that a participating
counterparty’s capital requirement for current credit exposure was the sum of the participant’s
pro-rata share of the clearing house exposure that it would be required to absorb from a default
by every other participant, individually, in the clearing system.
The “Consultative Paper on On-Balance Sheet Netting” (BIS, 1998) extended the scope of
netting beyond derivatives to On-Balance Sheet items, such as deposits and loans. It proposed
to accept novation netting as a means of reducing gross exposures to a single net amount, pro-
vided the following four conditions are met; First, the reporting bank has a well-founded legal
basis for concluding the netting or offsetting and the agreement is enforceable in each relevant
jurisdiction. Second, the maturity of the deposit is at least as long as the corresponding loan.
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Third, the positions are denominated in the same currency. Fourth, the reporting bank monitors
and controls the relevant exposures on a net basis.
This prompted the Basel Committees’ and the IOSCO Technical Committees’ concerns about
supervisors receiving sufficient information on a bank’s derivative activities, causing them to
issue “Framework for Supervisory Information about Derivatives Activities of Banks and Se-
curities Firms” (1995). The first part of this document examines how banking regulators re-
quire information on the firm’s Value at Risk (VaR) models as well as summary VaR numbers
(high/low/average). The second part consists of a common minimum framework which the
committees regard as the baseline of disclosure requirements for large and internationally active
banks. The Committee also recommended the disclosure of Summary VaR and/or Earnings
at Risk (EaR) information and scenario analysis of the impact of rate shocks for non-traded
portfolios. Firms are also expected to give information about the effect of off-balance sheet
positions on their earnings.
2.3 Credit Risk Models
BIS rewards banks for modelling credit risk and for openly reporting on the performance of these
models. There are four main types of credit risk models used in the banking industry. Three
papers that review these models are Crouchy, Galai and Mark (2000), Phelan and Alexander
(1999) and Basel Committee (1991). These will not be discussed in great detail since interna-
tional banks are more subject to settlement risk than credit risk, and so rarely go into liquidation.
Nevertheless, since we will be measuring exposure before netting and then after netting, the use
of the most popular industry accepted credit risk models will facilitate a structured approach
and link together many of the topics to be discussed. The four main model categories are listed
below.
The KMV PortfolioManager Model by KMV Corporation (Vasicek, 1987) essentially uses a
database of thousands of banks’ historical financial data forming multiple time series. By using
measures such as Loss Given Default (LGD) and Expected Default Frequency (EDF), Portfo-
lioManager applies covariance matrices to estimate a bank’s Joint Default Frequency (JDF).
Explicitly calculating this relationship requires the calculation of a double integral (over all pos-
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sible asset values) for each pair of banks in the portfolio. Even for the average sized portfolio,
this approach is cost prohibitive from a computational perspective, and so MC simulation is
often used to estimate these JDFs. This adds to the literature that recommends the adoption
of the MC method in modelling credit and settlement risk.
The CreditMetrics Model by J.P. Morgan (1997) is the credit risk counterpart to the RiskMet-
rics model, where RiskMetrics is predominantly a market risk model, also from J. P. Morgan
Ltd. Although RiskMetrics is based on Merton’s (1974) work on the relationship between a
couterparty’s capital structure and insolvency risk, CreditMetrics only makes use of the basic
idea from this approach. CreditMetrics achieve this by simulating correlated standard-normally
distributed random numbers. This supports the use of simulation methods (including MC) and
supports the netting research of Fermanian and Scaillet (2003) in which greater correlations
within a portfolio’s asset group leads to greater risks, both with and without netting.
The CreditRisk+ Model by Credit Suisse First Boston (1997) is also known as the actuarial
risk model. Only credit risk from defaults is considered, allowing for a more closed-form ana-
lytical solution in the form of stochastic differential equations (SDEs) and the use of Poisson
distributions. Since credit default rates are reported in the finance industry predominantly as
discrete values, the continuous SDE model outputs are discretized.
Finally, the CreditPortfolioView Model by McKinsey and Company (Wilson, 1997) is also known
as the econometric risk model. Its concept can be seen to lie in between that of the CreditRisk+
and the CreditMetrics models. Default rates though, are calculated in a more sophisticated
manner by using complete time series of various macroeconomic variables such as FX rates to
simulate future events. It is based on the causal observation that default probabilities and mi-
gration probabilities are directly impacted when the economy worsens, which results in down
grades as well as increased credit defaults.
These credit risk models have MC simulation as a common similarity in the way in which
their models are numerically approximated.
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2.4 Netting Research
It is rare to find quantitative research papers that discuss netting generally, let alone any of the
types of netting. As mentioned in a previous section, most of the sparse literature on netting
is qualitative and expressed in a legal context. The following research papers discuss the quan-
titative aspects of netting and their mathematical approach provides a deeper insight into the
mechanics of netting itself.
Gizycki and Gray (1994) discuss netting impacts on primarily swap and Forward Rate Agree-
ment (FRA) portfolios of Australian banks. The authors mention that there are essentially two
simple ways to look at the behaviour of netting on potential exposure within portfolios. The
first of these is the worst case scenario basis, and the second is the statistical analysis of portfo-
lio value changes over time. The worst case scenario basis involves simulating exposure values
that have high correlation so that the netting impact can be observed at its maximum. The
statistical analysis basis involves looking at the potential exposure by considering changes in net
replacement costs, i.e. the costs required to replace the portfolio in case of a default. Whilst
netting may, therefore, reduce the level of current credit risk of a portfolio, it says little about
the potential exposure, as it is determined by changes in the net replacement cost. Gizycki and
Gray conclude by reinforcing the importance of Add-Ons by referring to the work by Estrella
and Hendricks (1992), who tested how well Add-Ons that were based on notional principals and
net replacement values, covered potential exposure as the proportion of the portfolio having
netting increases.
Fermanian and Scaillet (2003) is by far the most complete work available on modelling the
impact of netting. The authors establish a fundamental framework for their research which
helps other researchers to see the link between financial econometrics and netting, and how
mathematics can be used to obtain new results on netting. The authors also agree with the
claim of this thesis, that papers on netting are not quantitative enough. Not only is netting dis-
cussed, but also close-out netting in particular. V aR and Expected Shortfall (ES) are analysed
both with and without netting to determine the changes due to netting.
Through the use of advanced analysis theory, Fermanian and Scaillet apply Lebesgue Inte-
gration and Non-Parametric Kernel Regression Estimators to estimate V aR and ES. In this
paper, V aR and ES are explained in terms of underlying portfolio asset components and also
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in terms of the corresponding portfolio loss functions. This allows for many netting concepts to
be formulated and tested. Fermanian and Scaillet point out that taking partial derivatives of
V aR and ES under netting would better allow risk managers to isolate high risk asset groups
because the portfolio is consequently decomposed into its asset group constituents. The authors
detail that for each of the j generalised partial derivatives of V aR and ES with respect to some
asset ², i.e. ∂²V aRj and ∂²ESj then j ∈ N requires the evaluation of underlying truncated
distributions. Although these distributions tend to be Gaussian as the time horizon approaches
infinity, ∂²V aRj and ∂²ESj themselves do not admit explicit forms (even for low values of
j). As a result, they need to be computed numerically, hence providing further reasoning for
the use of MC Simulation techniques. Finally, the authors plot the relationship between V aR
and V aR sensitivity on correlation, both with and without netting. They conclude that netting
reduces or smooths out the sensitivity effects on V aR as correlation amongst contracts increases.
Emmons (1995) is the second most complete quantitative work on netting, after that of Ferma-
nian and Scaillet (2003). Emmons begins by stating that whilst netting is essentially a beneficial
and worthwhile risk management strategy, it is not quantitatively documented in the scarcely
available literature that it can increase the default risk of the bank creditors that have not
entered into the netting agreement(s). Emmons points out how the US Federal Reserve Bank
is aware of these risk shifts due to netting and so has implemented numerous “safeguards”
such as debit caps, stringent collateral requirements, intraday monitoring and overdraft pricing.
Emmons suggests that future research on netting impacts should analyse the trade off between
netting and no netting. A formula needs to be found to determine optimal levels of netting for
each individual bank after having taken an interbank analysis. Emmons mathematically shows
how bilateral netting reduces credit default risk less than multilateral netting, yet more than
gross netting. This is achieved by the application of the Law of Large Numbers, and basic limit
convergence theorems. Emmons then extends the research by stating that in the limit, i.e. as
the number of banks included in multilateral netting agreements increases without bound, the
proportion of credit default risk borne by net interbank balances approaches zero. “In practice,
a large multinational netting agreement may approach this limit with as few as one hundred
members” (Emmons, 1995, p19). This convergence proposition was not proved by Emmons and
so this thesis suppliments Emmons’ research by investigated this claim as part of its MC simu-
lation experiments and more generalised mathematical formulation of interbank netting schemes.
Wahrenburg (1997) outlines how aggregating portfolio asset group exposures can have counter-
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intuitive effects on the overall portfolio exposure. Examples cited include unintentional transfers
of risk between banks and some exposures not having large netted reductions. This is because
of netting’s subtractive 2 properties can cause sudden reductions in a portfolio’s overall credit
exposure, making it more difficult to forecast trends. Discontinuities in the exposure curves
due to netting results in lower predictive ability using conventional measures, increased variance
and raises the need to reformulate VaR to account for these anomalies. At one extreme, the
settlement agent may take no settlement risk. This, in effect, allocates the settlement risks of
settlement to the participants in the system. At the other extreme a settlement agent could bear
all of the settlement risks of settlement. For example, the “agent” could disburse settlement
payments to net creditors before receiving amounts due from net debtors in a clearing, thus
temporarily financing a settlement. This allocates all settlement risk to the “agent”. However,
this paper only looked at a specific example by basing its conclusions on two simplified swap
contracts.
Levy and Clarke (2000) state that it is intuitively clear that netting reduces the risks of deriva-
tive transactions. Unfortunately, the computational modelling of netting impacts upon credit
risk is much more challenging to establish and is not discussed at great detail. The paper shows
how MC simulation can overcome many subtleties of the exposure calculations, thus avoiding an
intractable calculation. Levy and Clarke claim that this approach represents an ideal trade-off
between accuracy and feasibility for large derivative portfolios. They also mention that there is
still much scope for research into the modelling of netting, hence supporting another claim of
this thesis, that there are existing opportunities for new netting research.
Bech, Madsen and Natrop (2002) summarise how Chakravorti (2000) generalised the various
forms of risk such as settlement and credit risk into a more general ‘systemic’ risk. They follow
the framework of De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) who define a systemic event as an event where
a shock to either a set of financial institutions or markets lead to considerable adverse effects on
other financial institutions or markets. Based on this all encompassing definition of a systemic
event, De Bandt and Hartmann defined systemic risk as the probability of such an event. Under
such a generalised framework, the authors are able to quantify contagion and the domino effects
within a netting environment. Although their matrix notation is elegant, it is only useful in
describing the importance of netting, but not in measuring it. It is claimed that the severity
2The word subtractive is used here because netting is a process of subtracting the smaller of the two counter-
party exposures from the larger.
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of the systemic event depends on the amount of liquidity reserved, which in turn determines
a threshold for netting impacts. The authors develop a trade-off between risk and liquidity
amounts, but do not divulge their specific details. All that is left for the reader is to piece
together that through an iterative approach of taking successive interpolations, the trade-off
function can be approximated. As is common with most research on netting, the authors turn
to simulation to estimate the severity of these risks under a netting environment. They conclude
that performing sensitivity analysis on the simulated time series shows that the result of low
systemic risk is robust to large changes in the liquidity available to the banking participants
under netting. Although the paper focuses on the Danish financial system, it does support that
netting reduces the impact of banking risks.
This chapter has reviewed the institutional banking and historical framework surrounding net-
ting and the credit risk models that are used within this banking industry setting. So far, the
scarcity of quantitative research on close-out netting suggests that a controlled environment or
modelling framework ahouls be established and enhanced to test various hypotheses. Having
revised the available literature relating to netting, both quantitative and qualitative, sufficient
context has been provided to commence the modelling methodology in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
Modelling Methodology
This chapter will build on the literature review of Chapter 2 by addressing the modelling method-
ology. Since netting minimises the impact of the volatility of asset returns, we will measure or
estimate the nature in which this occurs. By volatility, we mean the stochastic volatility of FX
rates amongst international banks, and not the volatility of bank’s domestic interest rates. If
we were to, for example, look at the volatility of Australian bank’s domestic interest rates, then
they would all have similar interest rates. This is because bank’s interest rates are based on
the Cash Rate which in Australia is determined by the federal RBA. Such an approach of just
analysing one countries banks would not maximise the presence of volatility and would hence
minimise the impact of netting.
A natural approach to the modelling would be to try and replicate various international bank’s
derivatives portfolios and then net them off. However, such an approach would complicate mat-
ters unnecessarily because one would need to determine each bank’s asset group composition
in terms of the asset types and their concentrations. Consider if there was then a sudden FX
rate volatility jump in the portfolio performance’s time series. It would then be much more
difficult to isolate whether such a change was due to the underlying volatility of the FX rate,
or the sensitivity of a particular asset class to the FX rate change. It is thus a much “cleaner”
approach to model the FX volatility itself, given that the objective of this thesis is to examine
netting’s ability to minimise risk rather than the details of the risk itself.
The most popular and accepted method of modelling FX volatility is the GARCH method-
ology (Hansen and Lunde, 2001). We can then pass modelled GARCH exposures through the
netting model, which will be discussed in detail below. MC simulation can ensure that we have
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taken sufficient GARCH simulations to ensure that our netted time series are representative of
the possible exposures. The sections of this chapter will be Data Preparation, Stochastic Volatil-
ity of FX Rates Methodology, GARCH Methodology, Netting Methodology, and MC Simulation
Methodology.
3.1 Data Preparation
This thesis has chosen to analyse the impact of FX volatility for five major currencies; Aus-
tralian dollar (AUD), Canadian dollar (CAD), Euro (EUR), Great British pound (GBP), and
Japanese yen (JPY). These currencies were chosen as they are frequently traded against the
Australian dollar, whilst maintaining the US dollar (USD) as the standard. Although there are
other frequently traded currencies such as the Chinese yuan (CNY), we restricted these to just
five. This is because the benefit of including additional currencies/banks is out-weighed by the
increase in cost of the calculations (Emmons, 1995). These calculations grow exponentially with
every additional linear increase in number of currencies/banks due to the multivariate nature of
netting. Any fewer than five FX rates would not adequately examine the multivariate 1 impact
of netting amongst these currencies.
The time interval for the data was chosen to be daily. This was because a smaller interval
would not be too relevant as netting is calculated on a “close of business” basis (i.e. daily)
(Lamfalussy, 1990). Choosing an interval smaller than daily would be difficult to obtain the
time series data. It would also make it more difficult to find other sources to cross-validate
the data, and would involve processing much larger volumes of data over the same time period.
Furthermore, this would not be appropriate as we are trying to predict what may happen in one
year’s time, not what will happen in a few week’s time. Such an approach would also involve
too much noise or unstructured volatility. Likewise, choosing an interval larger than daily would
be like aggregating daily FX rates into weekly, fortnightly or monthly totals, thereby reducing
the volatility we are trying to model. We also do not want to predict what may happen in 5-10
years time either, hence daily data was chosen.
The time period for the data was two years, spanning 01/01/2004 to 31/12/2005. Two years
was chosen so that the first year could be used for the model build or development, and the
second year could be used for model validation or testing the predictions, as shown in Figure
1This will become more apparent after the Netting Methodology section below.
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3.1.
Build/Development
Sample Test/ValidationSample
01/01/2004 31/12/200531/12/2004 01/01/2005
Figure 3.1: Use of Two Years of Daily FX Rate Data
Apart from the above justification for using two years of data, the reason why the same approach
was not applied for say four or ten years worth, was that predicting daily data for one year out-of-
sample would constitute 365 data points, which is adequate enough without being too excessive.
Furthermore, as we will be using five FX rates, this would generate 365×5 = 1, 825 data points.
Since we will be repeating these projections over 250 MC simulations, this would then generate
1, 825 × 250 = 456, 250 data points. If we were then to predict two years out-of-sample, then
this count would double to 912,500 data points, and so on. The reason why 2004 and 2005 data
was chosen is due to these years being the most recent sets having the full yearly cycle of data
available.
The underlying distributions were chosen to be the normal or Gaussian as most FX rate returns
and their daily differences (i.e. xt − xt−1) can also be adequately approximated by this distri-
bution (Andersen, Bollerslev et. al., 1999). The Gaussian is also frequently used in GARCH
specifications. Later we will find that for one of the FX rates, a better choice was found than
the Gaussian.
3.2 Stochastic Volatility of FX Rates Methodology
In finance, the FX rate between two currencies specifies how much one currency is worth in
terms of the other. The Currency Market or FX Market is the largest market in the world. By
some estimates, about $2 trillion USD worth of currency changes hands every day (BIS, 1998).
The general class of continuous-time FX models of currency return volatility can be written
as a stochastic differential equation of the type,
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dXt = µ[Xt; Θ]dt+ σ[Xt; Θ]dWt, (3.1)
where Wt is a Brownian motion, µ[Xt; Θ] is the risk neutral drift function, and σ[Xt; Θ] is the
diffusion function. µ[Xt; Θ] and σ[Xt; Θ] are assumed to be functions of the state variable X
and some unknown parameter vector Θ ∈ RK (Ullrich, 2005).
In the study of FX returns, it has been a known fact that the return itself can not be pre-
dicted (Yang, 2003). It is the forecasting of the returns’ volatility that is of special interest.
By returns, we mean daily difference data as per above. As a time series with zero conditional
mean, the FX differences are conveniently modelled as a process {Yt}∞t=0 of the form,
Yt = σ2t ²t,∈ N, (3.2)
where the {²t}∞t=0’s are iid random variables independent of Y0 and satisfying E(²t) = 0,
E(²2t ) = 1, E(²
4
t ) = m4 < +∞, while {σ2t }∞t=0 denotes the conditional volatility series σ2t =
var(Yt|Yt−1, Yt−2, ...).
At this stage, the reader may be anticipating a subsection on short term interest rates, long
term (forward) interest rates, term-structure of interest rates, yield curves and other related
areas. Although change in interest rates is important, this thesis is concerned with how netting
minimises the effects of FX rate volatilities, and not so much on what are the drivers behind
interest rate and FX volatility.
Empirical evidence has led to the understanding that σ2t depends on infinitely many past re-
turns Yt−j , j ∈ N, with diminishing weights (Yang, 2005). The GARCH(p,q) model of Bollerslev
(1986), for example, allows the volatility function to depend on all past observations, with geo-
metrically decaying rate, the most commonly used is the GARCH(1,1) model.
3.3 GARCH Methodology
Before moving onto GARCH models, we begin by stating that the more simpler version that
takes account of financial time series characteristics is the Autoregressive Conditional Het-
eroscedasticity (ARCH) process (Engle, 1982). ARCH models are generally couched in terms
of asset returns or differences. The ARCH model is a technique used in finance to model asset
price volatility over time.
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It is observed in many time series data on asset prices that there are periods when variance
is high and periods where variance is low. The ARCH econometric model for this is that the
variance of the series itself is an AR (autoregressive) time series, often a linear one. Formally,
per Bollerslev et. al. (1992) and Engle (1982), an ARCH model is a discrete time stochastic
process et of the form et = ztst (i.e. as per Equation 3.2), where the zt’s are iid over time,
E(zt) = 0, var(zt) = 1, and st > 0 and time-varying. Usually st is further modelled to be an
autoregressive process. According to Andersen and Bollerslev (1995, 1996, 1997), ARCH models
are usually estimated by maximum likelihood techniques. They almost always give a leptokur-
tic distribution of asset differences even if one assumes that each period’s returns are normal,
because the variance is not the same each period. More generally speaking, the ARCH(q) model
expresses the conditional variance as a linear function of the past q innovations,
σ2t = a0 +
q∑
i=1
ai²
2
t−i. (3.3)
For the conditional variance to be positive, the parameters must satisfy a0 > 0 and ai ≥ 0 for
i = 1, ..., q. Empirical evidence has shown that a high q must be selected in order to estimate
the conditional variance properly. To circumvent this problem, Bollerslev (1986) proposed the
generalized ARCH, or GARCH(p, q), model,
σ2t = a0 +
q∑
i=1
ai²
2
t−i +
p∑
j=1
bjσ
2
t−j , (3.4)
where a0 > 0 and ai ≥ 0 for i ∈ {1, ..., q}, and bj ≥ 0 for j ∈ {1, ..., p}. If
(∑q
i=1 ai +
∑p
j=1 bj
)
<
1, then the process ²t is covariance stationary and its unconditional variance is equal to,
σ2 =
a0
1−∑qi=1 ai −∑pj=1 bj . (3.5)
A special case of the GARCH family is the Exponentially Weighted Moving Average (EWMA)
alternative, used by the company RiskMetrics when they introduced the Analytic VaR method-
ology. The RiskMetrics model for volatility forecasting imposes the restrictions that a0 = 0 and(∑q
i=1 ai +
∑p
j=1 bj
)
= 1. In addition, the parameter
∑p
j=1 bj is not estimated, but imposed to
be equal to 0.94 for daily data and go back 75 data points in their estimation horizon (Neely and
Weller, 2001). The GARCH(p,q) model successfully captures several characteristics of financial
time series, such as thick tailed returns and volatility clustering, as noted by Mandelbrot (1963
p394) “large changes tend to be followed by large changes of either sign, and small changes tend
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to be followed by small changes”.
Results in Figlewski (1997) show that GARCH models fitted to daily data are quite useful
in forecasting the volatility in stock markets both for short and long horizons, although they
are much less useful in making out-of-sample forecasts in other markets beyond short horizons.
Berkowitz and O’Brien (2002) report that the poor performance of banks’ trading portfolios
during the 1998-2000 period was mainly due to FX rate positions. Vlaar (2000) examines the
out-of-sample forecast accuracy of several univariate volatility models (equally and exponentially
weighted sample averages as well as GARCH models) for portfolios of Dutch bonds with differ-
ent maturities. In addition, he examines the impact of alternative distributional assumptions.
He concludes that VaR measures can be most simply and accurately specified using GARCH
with a normal distribution and MC simulation.
Bond returns implied by interbank money market rates (LIBOR) can be used instead of bond
returns. This is done in other studies such as Duffie and Singleton (1999) and presents several
advantages. First, the interbank money market is more liquid than the Treasury bill market in
most countries. Second, most FX rate derivatives are priced using interbank FX rates. Third,
credit risk minimally affects these rates as they are subject to special contractual netting fea-
tures and correspond to trades among high-grade banks.
On the other hand, the GARCH structure presents some drawbacks on implementation, since
it (a) requires large numbers of observations to produce reliable estimates, and (b) may be un-
stable out of sample. It also imposes important limitations on the theoretical approach since
variance depends on the magnitude and not on the sign of ²t, which is somewhat at odds with
the empirical behaviour of stock market prices where a leverage effect may be present.
There are a number of variations to the standard GARCH(p,q) model, including Nelson’s (1991)
Exponential GARCH, or EGARCH(p,q) model and the Threshold GARCH, or TGARCH(p,q)
model. This thesis will focus on the general GARCH(1,1) model as this has the most superior
predictive ability at modelling mainstream FX rate effects (Hansen and Lunde, 2001). Hansen
and Lunde make out-of-sample comparisons of the GARCH(1,1) model against 330 different
volatility models using daily FX rate data (DEM and IBM stock prices). Although some mod-
els were better at forecasting one stock better than the other, no model provided a significantly
better forecast than the GARCH(1,1) model. This result is established by the tests for superior
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predictive ability of White (2000) and Hansen (2001).
3.4 Netting Methodology
This section details the mathematical framework to describe the netting interaction between
banks. We begin by formulating the generalised netting model and then later provide an example
of the model for two banks.
3.4.1 Generalised Netting Model
Let eˆi,j(t) denote the exposure amount eˆ to be paid at time t from Bank i to Bank j as reported
by Bank i. Within a netting scheme of n banks, the exposure matrix E is defined as,
E =

0 eˆ1,2(t) · · · · · · eˆ1,n(t)
eˆ2,1(t) 0
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . 0 eˆn−1,n(t)
eˆn,1(t) · · · · · · eˆn,n−1(t) 0

, (3.6)
and captures all the gross exposure amounts for all the n banks participating within a netting
scheme. Such an exposure matrix formulation was first documented by Emmons (1995).
We now define a Netting operator N1(∗) and apply this to the netting scheme E such that,
N1(E) = N1


0 eˆ1,2(t) · · · · · · eˆ1,n(t)
eˆ2,1(t) 0
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . 0 eˆn−1,n(t)
eˆn,1(t) · · · · · · eˆn,n−1(t) 0


=

0 eˆ1,2(t)− eˆ2,1(t) · · · · · · eˆ1,n(t)− eˆn,1(t)
eˆ2,1(t)− eˆ1,2(t) 0 . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . 0 eˆn−1,n(t)− eˆn,n−1(t)
eˆn,1(t)− eˆ1,n(t) · · · · · · eˆn,n−1(t)− eˆn−1,n(t) 0

.
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This is the definition by Bech, Madsen and Natrop (2002), hence forth referred to as BMN.
However, since eˆi,j(t) − eˆj,i(t) = − [eˆj,i(t)− eˆi,j(t)], the BMN definition hides some of the finer
details. This is because negative exposures do not relate to the practical application and usage
of payment and netting systems, in which all netted exposures are recorded as positive amounts.
Another issue with this definition is that it does not capture how, when two banks net off their
exposures, the bank with the lowest exposure is reduced to zero.
BMN also define a second version of the netting operator, N2(∗) as,
N2(E) = N2


0 e1,2(t) · · · · · · e1,n(t)
e2,1(t) 0
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . 0 en−1,n(t)
en,1(t) · · · · · · en,n−1(t) 0


=

0 |e1,2(t)− e2,1(t)| · · · · · · |e1,n(t)− en,1(t)|
|e2,1(t)− e1,2(t)| 0 . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . 0 |en−1,n(t)− en,n−1(t)|
|en,1(t)− e1,n(t)| · · · · · · |en,n−1(t)− en−1,n(t)| 0

.
Although this definition does not have any negative exposures, it has weaknesses. Since |ei,j(t)− ej,i(t)|
= |ej,i(t)− ei,j(t)|, this version looses much of the information because there is no way to ascer-
tain which of the two banks has the higher exposure. This means that N2(∗) only captures the
greatest remaining netted amount for just one of the two banks.
In this thesis we overcome the above limitations by altering a netting definition by Fermanian
and Scaillet (2003). Fermanian and Scaillet define a Netting operator (∗)+ as [ei,j(t), ej,i(t)]+ =
max {ei,j(t) + ej,i(t), 0}, thus changing the above definition of N2(∗) to N3(∗), as shown below.
27
N
3
(E
)
=
N
3
                      
0
e 1
,2
(t
)
··
·
··
·
e 1
,n
(t
)
e 2
,1
(t
)
0
. .
.
. . .
. . .
. .
.
. .
.
. .
.
. . .
. . .
. .
.
0
e n
−1
,n
(t
)
e n
,1
(t
)
··
·
··
·
e n
,n
−1
(t
)
0
                      
=
           
0
m
ax
{e
1
,2
(t
)
+
e 2
,1
(t
),
0}
··
·
··
·
m
ax
{e
1
,n
(t
)
+
e n
,1
(t
),
0}
m
ax
{e
2
,1
(t
)
+
e 1
,2
(t
),
0}
0
. .
.
. . .
. . .
. .
.
. .
.
. .
.
. . .
. . .
. .
.
0
m
ax
{e
n
−1
,n
(t
)
+
e n
,n
−1
(t
),
0}
m
ax
{e
n
,1
(t
)
+
e 1
,n
(t
),
0}
··
·
··
·
m
ax
{e
n
,n
−1
(t
)
+
e n
−1
,n
(t
),
0}
0
           .
28
This definition captures the banking practice of recording the Bank with the lower exposure to
have a netted exposure of zero, and also captures the requirement that banks do not have any
negative netted exposures. However, this definition implicitly assumes that ei,j(t) > 0 implies
that ej,i(t) < 0 and that ei,j(t) < 0 implies that ej,i(t) > 0 if netting is to occur at all, and so it
requires at least one gross or pre-netted exposure to be negative. Such an approach is somewhat
unorthodox since netting is a process of subtraction of positive exposure amounts.
To remedy this, the Fermanian and Scaillet definition was refined to arrive at the netting model
used in this thesis. Here we use N(∗), where N [ei,j(t), ej,i(t)] = max{ei,j(t) − ej,i(t), 0} and is
shown in further detail below in Equation 3.7.
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We can now demonstrate how this model can be applied to data by presenting an example of
two Banks. An example of three Banks together with other formulaic netting results that have
been derived as part of this thesis can be found in the Appendix - Additional Theoretical
Results.
3.4.2 Example of Two Banks
Take two Banks x1 and x2. Although a diagram is not required for this case, such diagrams will
be useful for three or more Banks. Their exposures, through bilateral netting agreements can
be shown schematically in Figure 3.2.
x
x1
2
Figure 3.2: Exposures Between Two Banks
Suppose that in our two Bank example of Bank x1 and Bank x2, that at some point in time t,
e1,2(t) = $60, 000, 000 and e2,1(t) = $65, 000, 000. Following on from our netting formulation of
Equation 3.7, the number of Banks n is n = 2, giving,
Without Netting
E =
 0 e1,2(t)
e2,1(t) 0

=
 0 $60, 000, 000
$65, 000, 000 0
 .
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With Netting
N(E) = N
 0 e1,2(t)
e2,1(t) 0

=
 0 max{e1,2(t)− e2,1(t), 0}
max{e2,1(t)− e1,2(t), 0} 0

=
 0 max{$60, 000, 000− $65, 000, 000, 0}
max{$65, 000, 000− $60, 000, 000, 0} 0

=
 0 0
$5, 000, 000 0
 .
Hence, under netting, Bank x1 no longer has an exposure to Bank x2, whilst Bank x2 has
reduced its exposure to Bank x1 down to $5,000,000.
3.5 MC Simulation Methodology
The MC simulation method is widely applied to large and complex problems to obtain approxi-
mate solutions. This method has been successfully applied to problems in physical sciences and,
more recently, in finance. Many difficult financial engineering problems such as the valuation of
multidimensional and path-dependent options contracts can be approximated due to this tech-
nique. Of particular importance to this thesis is its application to the simulation and modelling
of the stochastic volatility of FX rates.
To a certain extent, MC simulation is not strictly required here due to the nature of GARCH
itself. The finer aspect of GARCH reveals that the way in which the GARCH parameters are
determined is via an optimisation of ordinary least squares (OLS) errors. This means that every
time we fit a GARCH model, we are essentially generating multiple estimates, checking conver-
gence and then refining the estimates, until the differences are minimised and that the process
has converged. This approach is a numerical approximation technique that is very similar to
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MC simulation. These iterations were carried out using the S+PLUS module S+FinMetrics.
MC simulation works by passing random numbers of known characteristics into the model under
consideration. One then analyses the resulting distribution to determine the overall effect of
the model. Convergence analysis of the simulations is then undertaken to determine whether
a stable solution or value can be determined. In practice, the random numbers are generated
from mathematical formulas and are hence called pseudo-random numbers. In our framework
this translates into the pseudo code of Algorithm 1 below.
Algorithm 1: MC Simulation of FX Rates
Generate a suitable distribution of pseudo-random numbers
For j=1 to N
Take j-th pseudo-random number and pass as input to the model
Measure model output
Determine nature of model output distribution
If nature of the distribution has converged Then
exit loop
Else
j=j+1
EndIf
End for
For the MC algorithm to be applied effectively, at least the following three main conditions
must be satisfied. First, the random number dataset must be sufficiently large enough to en-
sure proper stress testing of the model (Shapiro and Homem-de-Mello, 2000). Second, the
random number dataset must be sufficiently random so as to not display banding or clustering
(Marsaglia, 1968). Third, the pseudo-random number generator must generate sequences of
sufficiently large enough period to allow accurate modelling (Brent and Zimmermann, 2003).
Currently, the Mersene Twister algorithm is the most popular and powerful generator with a
period of 219,937 − 1 (Matsumoto and Nishimura, 1998).
To apply a MC simulation algorithm and uphold the above conditions, we need to review
the literature on how one can measure progress towards convergence around an approximate
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solution that is sufficiently accurate for one’s needs.
3.5.1 MC Expected Error and Estimates
MC Simulation is an attractive estimation procedure for GARCH because the conditional distri-
bution of the latent variable is straight forward to derive given the GARCH coefficients. In turn,
the conditional distributions of the GARCH coefficients typically are Gaussian, given values for
the latent variable. The key idea behind MC estimation is that after a sufficient number of iter-
ations, the draws from the respective conditional distributions jointly represent a draw from the
joint posterior distribution, which often cannot be evaluated directly (Gelfand and Smith, 1990).
Consider a function h(x) where x is an n-dimensional vector over some volume Ω.
∫
h(x)dx = λ(Ω)
∫
hdφ = λ(Ω)E[h], (3.8)
where dφ = dx/λ(Ω) and λ(Ω) is the volume of Ω, i.e. its Lesbesgue measure. Note that h need
not be non-negative or positive (Al-Mharmah, 1998). E[h] is the expected value in integrating
the function h(x) and is typically difficult to express in a closed analytic form. MC simulation
can form an estimate for E[h], which has the following form,
E[h] =
1
N
N∑
i=1
f(xi) + ², (3.9)
where ² is an error term and f(x) is the function that can’t be integrated easily. E[h] becomes an
approximation when we assume that ² is zero. What makes it MC simulation is when the points
xi are distributed according to the distribution φ, the variance of the distribution is defined as
follows,
σ2(h) = E
[
(h−E (h))2
]
. (3.10)
The expected error of the MC estimate is thus defined to be its sample variance, i.e.,
σ2² (h) = E
( 1
N
N∑
i=1
f(xi)−E(h)
)2 = σ2(h)
N
, (3.11)
(Niederreiter, 1992). Central to these analyses is often the normal or Gaussian Distribution, as
the most common distribution in nature.
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We can now begin relating these measures back to finance, by addressing the impact of netting
on a portfolio of returns that are dependent on FX rate fluctuations. However, as we try to
estimate a portfolio loss distribution measure such as VaR via MC Simulation, we are faced
with a number of financial issues. These issues are listed below and to overcome these, certain
extensions need to be made to MC Simulation.
3.5.2 Extensions of MC Simulation for Financial Time Series Data
The experience of decades of quantitative analysis of financial data has shown some specific
ways in which observed financial time series can fail to satisfy the properties of the Gaussian
distribution. The reasons for this are;
1. Fat tails: the marginal distributions of financial time series have a typical shape which
differs from the Gaussian. Many financial time series are higher in the tail and central
areas, while lower in the shoulders, characteristic of the leptokurtic nature of financial
returns.
2. Stochastic volatility: it is observed (and expected by no arbitrage considerations) that the
autocorrelation of log returns decays quickly to near zero over the time scale of minutes.
However, higher order autocorrelations exhibit memory effects which can be interpreted
as serial correlation in the covariance matrix.
3. Skewness: left tails tend to be slightly fatter than right tails.
4. Scaling effects: marginal distributions of asset returns measured over two different time
increments are related by a simple scaling transformation (Gopikrishnan, et. al., 1999).
5. Multivariate effects: observed multivariate data has “tail dependence” (Joe, 1997). The
observed tail dependence corresponds to the econometric statement that joint extreme
moves are systematically more frequent than is consistent with multivariate Gaussian
models.
The final effect listed above has important implications for portfolio theory. It implies that the
strategy of portfolio diversification, the most important principle in financial risk management,
has less power than otherwise expected to mitigate risk under scenarios of market distress (Abad
and Hurd, 2003). This means that under MC simulation of GARCH(1,1) models, alternative
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distributions may most likely be required for at least some of the FX rates. The typical exten-
sions or refinements to the Gaussian distribution are the Student-t, generalised error distribution
(GED) and the double error distribution (DED).
In summary, we have investigated the FX daily rates of five international currencies and have
examined their stochastic volatility. By having then discussed the GARCH methodology, we
have been able to generate five realistic time series models. These models would ultimately
feed into the netting model, which was also detailed. Finally, we discussed the MC simulation
methodology which explained how the models will generate the simulated FX rates through the
use of appropriate pseudo-random numbers. We are now ready to apply these methodologies to
derive the results.
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Chapter 4
Modelling Results
After having extensively detailed the modelling methology, we are now ready to review the
results. This chapter will be composed of the following sections; FX Rate Time Series Data,
GARCH Models, MC GARCH Simulations, and Application of Netting Model. This essentially
allows for the input data to the model to be analysed, the model(s) generalised and simulated,
and finally for the netted distributions to be compared.
4.1 FX Rate Time Series Data
We begin our modelling by analysing the FX Daily Average Interbank Rate for the five currencies
we have chosen. The data was obtained from OANDA Corporation 1. Figure 4.1 below charts
the nature of this data through the use of S-PLUS and it’s financial package S+FinMetrics. As
mentioned above, all analysis was carried out in this environment.
1OANDA Corporation provides data at http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory.
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Figure 4.1: Daily FX Rate Data for 2004-2005
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Figure 4.1 shows two years worth of data. Since we will be modelling the first year, Figure 4.2
shows just the first year in more detail.
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Figure 4.2: Daily FX Rate Data for 2004
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Since GARCH models the volatility of the differences and not the original time series data, daily
differences were calculated for Figure 4.1 as shown in Figure 4.3, and calculated for Figure 4.2
as shown in Figure 4.4.
41
USD/AUD Interbank FX Rate Daily Differences
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
2004 2005 2006
-
0.
02
-
0.
01
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
USD/CAD Interbank FX Rate Daily Differences
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
2004 2005 2006
-
0.
02
-
0.
01
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
USD/EUR Interbank FX Rate Daily Differences
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
2004 2005 2006
-
0.
01
5
-
0.
01
0
-
0.
00
5
0.
00
0
0.
00
5
0.
01
0
0.
01
5
USD/GBP Interbank FX Rate Daily Differences
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
2004 2005 2006
-
0.
01
0
-
0.
00
6
-
0.
00
2
0.
00
2
0.
00
6
USD/JPY Interbank FX Rate Daily Differences
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1
2004 2005 2006
-
2.
5
-
2.
0
-
1.
5
-
1.
0
-
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
1.
5
2.
0
2.
5
Figure 4.3: Daily FX Rate Differences for 2004-2005
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Figure 4.4: Daily FX Rate Differences for 2004
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Since we will be using the first year’s difference data to build each model, we refer to 4.4. This
shows the volatility of each FX rate’s differences, and suggests that they are generally bound
above by 0.01 and below by 0.01. To obtain a clearer measure for these bounds, the differences
were plotted with two conditional standard deviations superimposed in Figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.5: FX Daily Differences and Two Conditional Standard Deviations Superimposed for
2004
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The observed patterns may be due to autocorrelation or, even more likely, heteroskedasticity
and so auto correlation function (ACF) plots of the FX rate daily differences were graphed in
Figure 4.6 together with ACF plots of the squared FX rate daily differences were graphed in
Figure 4.7.
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Figure 4.6: ACF of FX Rate Daily Differences for 2004
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Figure 4.7: ACF of FX Rate Squared Daily Differences for 2004
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From Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7, both the ACF of the differences and the squared differences
exhibit some autocorrelation, up to at least lag 25. Since the squared differences measure the
second order moment of the original differences, this result indicates that the variance of these
differences that are conditional on their past history may change over time, or equivalently,
these differences may exhibit time varying conditional heteroskedasticity or volatility clustering.
To determine whether this time dependence was persistent, a cross correlation function (CCF)
plot was graphed in Figure 4.8 between the squared daily differences, crossed with just the daily
differences.
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Figure 4.8: FX Rate Squared Daily Differences Cross Correlation with Daily Differences for
2004
50
Figure 4.8 doesn’t show any obvious CCF characteristics over time. This provided further
support to use a GARCH framework. To shed further light into this figure, histograms were
graphed in Figure 4.9.
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Figure 4.9: FX Rate Differences Histograms for 2004
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Figure 4.9 suggests that the differences for some but not all FX rates may not be normally
distributed. To further explore this hypothesis, a quantile (QQ) plot was graphed in Figure
4.10.
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Figure 4.10: FX Rate Differences QQ-Plots for 2004
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Figure 4.10 provides further evidence that the differences for some but not all FX rates may not
be normally distributed, but we cannot as yet determine which is a more suitable distribution.
Finally, the summary statistics are listed in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: FX Rate Summary Statistics for 2004
FX Rate Mean Variance S.D. Skewness Kurtosis
USD/AUD -0.0001299 0.0000969 0.0098415 0.4627727 1.446223
USD/CAD -0.0002526 0.0000413 0.0064256 0.2439137 2.712788
USD/EUR -0.0001701 0.0000219 0.0046760 0.2787559 1.745698
USD/GBP -0.0001121 0.0000085 0.0029195 0.1887077 1.150171
USD/JPY -0.0117810 0.3257136 0.5707132 0.2659795 2.035926
From Table 4.1, four of the five currencies are similarly distributed, except for USD/JPY which
has a much larger variance/standard deviation.
4.2 GARCH Models
To further verify whether a GARCH specification was appropriate, the null hypothesis was
proposed that the data had no ARCH effects. The ARCH test in S+FinMetrics is essentially a
Lagrange Multiplier Test and resulted in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: FX Rate ARCH Test Summary Statistics for 2004
FX Rate Test Stat p-Value D.F.
USD/AUD 51.3305 0.0015 25
USD/CAD 31.5985 0.1700 25
USD/EUR 37.2604 0.0545 25
USD/GBP 69.5601 0.0000 25
USD/JPY 36.8337 0.0599 25
Since the p-values are all smaller than the conventional 5% level, we accept the alternative hy-
pothesis (i.e. that there are ARCH effects) and we proceed to model GARCH effects for each
FX rate. Since ARCH effects were present, ordinary least squares (OLS) would not suffice and
the more generalised maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) technique would be required for
parameter estimation.
The GARCH algorithm 2 in S+FinMetrics was executed for each FX rate and the iterations
all converged except for the USD/EUR rate. For the USD/EUR rate, no local maximum was
reached in a reasonable number of iterations. This suggests, although further analysis is re-
quired, and that although a GARCH(1,1) model is appropriate, a Gaussian error distribution
2S+FinMetrics uses the BHHH Algorithm (Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman, 1974).
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is not the best possible choice. This also suggested that the estimated asymptotic variance is
not well defined under such a distribution. Figure 4.11 then was graphed to assess the overall
performance of the GARCH(1,1) models at predicting the volatility.
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Figure 4.11: USD/EUR FX Daily Differences and GARCH(1,1) Conditional Standard Deviation
for 2004 Using Student-t Distribution
Figure 4.11 shows that for the 3rd panel (i.e. USD/EUR) the model’s volatility decays consis-
tently over time. This is because
(∑q
i=1 ai +
∑p
j=1 bj
)
> 1 and that the GARCH(1,1) model
was not correctly specified. This is further evidence that the Gaussian distribution was not
appropriate for the USD/EUR GARCH(1,1). A number of underlying non-Gaussian error dis-
tributions were then examined, namely the Student-t Distribution, the GED and the DED. The
corresponding GARCH(1,1) summary statistics are shown in Table 4.3 3.
3Table 4.3 looks at GARCH(1,1) model’s parameters in relation to each of the four main distributions. As
will be made more apparent in Equation 4.1, through the notation of S+FinMtrics, C refers to c, A refers to a0,
ARCH(1) refers to a1, and GARCH(1) refers to b1.
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Table 4.3: Distribution Specifications for USD/EUR
Distribution Parameter Value Std.Error t-Value Pr(> |t|)
Gaussian
C -0.0003454 0.0001987 -1.738 0.0415
A -0.0000001 0.0000000 -3.294 0.0005
ARCH(1) 0.0052270 0.0035010 1.493 0.0682
GARCH(1) 0.9986000 0.0055550 179.759 0.0000
Student-t
C -0.0003773 0.0001903 -1.983 0.0241
A 0.0000001 0.0000002 0.235 0.4072
ARCH(1) 0.0201200 0.0182700 1.102 0.1357
GARCH(1) 0.9783000 0.0207700 47.101 0.0000
GED
C -0.0001000 0.0000701 -1.428 0.0771
A 0.0000001 0.0000003 0.222 0.4122
ARCH(1) 0.0165800 0.0193000 0.859 0.1954
GARCH(1) 0.9793000 0.0288000 34.007 0.0000
DED
C -0.0002000 0.0001531 -1.307 0.0961
A -0.0000000 0.0000002 -0.111 0.4558
ARCH(1) 0.0102700 0.0114600 0.897 0.1853
GARCH(1) 0.9872000 0.0189800 52.009 0.0000
Table 4.3 shows that for the constant C, the Student-t was the distribution with the lowest
Pr (> ‖t‖) and t-value. This together with the fact that the Student-t is a common alternative
to the Gaussian (Bollerslev, 1986), made it the overall better model fit to the USD/EUR FX
rate data. The final models were then shown in Figure 4.12 together with their daily differences.
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Figure 4.12: FX Daily Differences and GARCH(1,1) Conditional Standard Deviation for 2004
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To further verify this choice of the Student-t, Figure 4.12 was magnified for the USD/EUR FX
rate in Figure 4.13.
0.
00
35
0.
00
45
0.
00
55
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan
2004 2005
Conditional SD
-
0.
01
0.
00
0.
01
Original Series
Va
lu
es
Series and Conditional SDUSD/EUR FX Rate
Figure 4.13: USD/EUR FX Daily Differences and GARCH(1,1) Conditional Standard Deviation
for 2004 Using Student-t Distribution
Figure 4.13 further justifies the use of Student-t by highlighting that the conditional standard
deviation is not as monotonic as for the use of the Gaussian. Figure 4.14 was then graphed to
help assess model fit and the resulting residuals.
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Figure 4.14: FX GARCH(1,1) Residuals for 2004
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Figure 4.14 shows that the GARCH(1,1) residuals are behaving as expected and follow the
overall pattern of the daily difference volatility. To obtain further insight into this GARCH
modelling, the residuals were standardised to produce Figure 4.15.
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Figure 4.15: FX GARCH(1,1) Standardised Residuals for 2004
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Figure 4.15 shows that these standardised residuals tend to mainly vary within±1. Furthermore,
the ACF of these standardised residuals was graphed in Figure 4.16.
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Figure 4.16: ACF of Standardised FX GARCH(1,1) Residuals for 2004
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Figure 4.16 shows that the standardised residuals have the similar ACF plots as the original
differences of Figure 4.4, exhibiting declining lags. To further complete the picture, the ACF of
the squared standardised residuals was plotted in Figure 4.17.
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Figure 4.17: ACF of Squared Standardised FX GARCH(1,1) Residuals for 2004
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Figure 4.17 shows that the squared standardised residuals have some serial correlation as evi-
denced by the persistent oscillation between positive and negative values for all FX rates. To
shed further light into the ACF plots, a cross correlation function (CCF) plot was graphed in
Figure 4.18.
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Figure 4.18: FX GARCH(1,1) Squared Residuals Cross Correlation with Resuduals for 2004
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Figure 4.18 better illustrates how the cross correlation between the FX GARCH(1,1) residu-
als and the squared residuals for each FX rate exhibit unique clustering over the time lags.
Histograms for the standardised residuals were graphed in Figure 4.19.
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Figure 4.19: FX Histograms of Standardised GARCH(1,1) Residuals for 2004
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Figure 4.19 shows that the standardised GARCH(1,1) residuals are unimodally distributed,
except for USD/GBP which seems to be bimodally distributed. USD/EUR and USD/AUD had
“fat tails” i.e. leptokurtosis. These standardised GARCH(1,1) residuals were then graphed in
quantile plots in Figure 4.20.
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Figure 4.20: FX QQ-Plot of Standardised GARCH(1,1) Residuals for 2004
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Figure 4.20 shows that the standardised GARCH(1,1) residuals fall mainly along the diagonal
line showing that they are well described by the normal distribution. Now that we are confident
with the chosen models, we list them in full detail with their parameters in Equations 4.2 to
4.6, with Equation 4.1 included as a reference.
yt = c+ yt−1
σ2t = a0 +
∑p
i=1 ai²
2
t−i +
∑q
j=1 bjσ
2
t−j
= a0 + a1²2t−1 + b1σ2t−1.
(4.1)
Note that since we are using GARCH(1,1), p = 1 = q.
USD/AUD
yt = −0.00028050 + yt−1
σ2t = 0.00000133 + 0.01715²
2
t−1 + 0.9683σ2t−1
(4.2)
USD/CAD
yt = −0.00023507 + yt−1
σ2t = 0.00003920 + 0.07073²
2
t−1 − 0.0479σ2t−1
(4.3)
USD/EUR
yt = −0.00037730 + yt−1
σ2t = 0.00000006 + 0.02012²
2
t−1 + 0.9783σ2t−1
(4.4)
USD/GBP
yt = −0.00013860 + yt−1
σ2t = 0.00000002 + 0.01417²
2
t−1 + 0.9814σ2t−1
(4.5)
USD/JPY
yt = −0.03247000 + yt−1
σ2t = 0.15177000 + 0.14566²
2
t−1 + 0.3970σ2t−1
(4.6)
To add the final level of detail regarding model fit, Tables 4.4 to 4.8 were included that de-
tail the above parameters together with all the parameter estimate statistics.
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Table 4.4: USD/AUD GARCH(1,1) Parameter Estimates for 2004
Estimated Coefficients Value Std. Error t-Value Pr(> |t|)
C -0.0002805 0.0005252 -0.5342 0.29677
A 0.0000013 0.0000017 0.7810 0.21767
ARCH(1) 0.0171500 0.0130000 1.3186 0.09406
GARCH(1) 0.9683000 0.0281800 34.3651 0.00000
Information Criterion AIC(4) -2336.374 BIC(4) -2320.774
Normality Test
Jarque-Bera p-Value Shapiro-Wilk p-Value
41.84 0.0000000008 0.9477 0.000000000000001
Ljung-Box Test for Statistic p-Value Chi2 D.F.
Standardized Residuals 13.09 0.3625 12
Ljung-Box Test for Statistic p-Value Chi2 D.F.
(Standardized Residuals)2 29.84 0.0030 12
Lagrange Multiplier Test
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4
-0.1008 -1.6010 -2.2310 -0.0800
Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8
0.8837 0.0057 1.2590 0.7548
Lag 9 Lag 10 Lag 11 Lag 12
-1.8170 -1.6660 0.3764 0.1453
C
0.09991
TR2 p-Value f-Stat p-Value
21.48 0.04383 2.079 0.0853
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Table 4.5: USD/CAD GARCH(1,1) Parameter Estimates for 2004
Estimated Coefficients Value Std. Error t-Value Pr(> |t|)
C -0.00023507 0.00033335 -0.7052 0.240575
A 0.00003924 0.00001595 2.4605 0.007171
ARCH(1) 0.07072875 0.03422492 2.0666 0.019743
GARCH(1) -0.04786471 0.35762637 -0.1338 0.446802
Information Criterion AIC(4) -2649.051 BIC(4) -2633.452
Normality Test
Jarque-Bera p-Value Shapiro-Wilk p-Value
97.23 0 0.9698 0.0003322
Ljung-Box Test for Statistic p-Value Chi2 D.F.
Standardized Residuals 24 0.02037 12
Ljung-Box Test for Statistic p-Value Chi2 D.F.
(Standardized Residuals)2 7.981 0.7866 12
Lagrange Multiplier Test
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4
0.1288 -1.362 -0.4821 -0.02432
Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8
0.2271 -0.7185 0.2176 -0.4478
Lag 9 Lag 10 Lag 11 Lag 12
-0.4709 -1.809 0.09417 0.06756
C
0.7255
TR2 p-Value f-Stat p-Value
7.33 0.835 0.6805 0.8591
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Table 4.6: USD/EUR GARCH(1,1) Parameter Estimates for 2004
Estimated Coefficients Value Std. Error t-Value Pr(> |t|)
C -0.00037730 0.00019030 -1.983 0.02408
A 0.00000006 0.00000024 0.235 0.40716
ARCH(1) 0.02012000 0.01827000 1.102 0.13565
GARCH(1) 0.97830000 0.02077000 47.101 0.00000
Information Criterion AIC(5) -2928.597 BIC(5) -2909.098
Normality Test
Jarque-Bera p-Value Shapiro-Wilk p-Value
38.75 0.00000000385 0.9586 0.00000000449
Ljung-Box Test for Statistic p-Value Chi2 D.F.
Standardized Residuals 15.45 0.2177 12
Ljung-Box Test for Statistic p-Value Chi2 D.F.
(Standardized Residuals)2 8.971 0.7054 12
Lagrange Multiplier Test
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4
-0.2028 0.07248 -1.416 -0.4309
Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8
-0.2054 1.648 -0.6758 0.4172
Lag 9 Lag 10 Lag 11 Lag 12
0.1315 -0.2626 -1.159 0.04616
C
0.6664
TR2 p-Value f-Stat p-Value
7.845 0.7972 0.7294 0.8155
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Table 4.7: USD/GBP GARCH(1,1) Parameter Estimates for 2004
Estimated Coefficients Value Std. Error t-Value Pr(> |t|)
C -0.00013860 0.00014410 -0.9618 0.16839
A 0.00000002 0.00000007 0.3098 0.37846
ARCH(1) 0.01417000 0.01017000 1.3931 0.08223
GARCH(1) 0.98140000 0.01708000 57.4686 0.00000
Information Criterion AIC(4) -3229.259 BIC(4) -3213.66
Normality Test
Jarque-Bera p-Value Shapiro-Wilk p-Value
8.224 0.01638 0.97 0.0003973
Ljung-Box Test for Statistic p-Value Chi2 D.F.
Standardized Residuals 8.707 0.7278 12
Ljung-Box Test for Statistic p-Value Chi2 D.F.
(Standardized Residuals)2 30.51 0.00234 12
Lagrange Multiplier Test
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4
-0.9377 0.7506 -2.021 -1.394
Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8
0.4901 2.611 -0.2348 -1.473
Lag 9 Lag 10 Lag 11 Lag 12
-2.659 -0.107 -0.9061 0.04919
C
0.3873
TR2 p-Value f-Stat p-Value
26.22 0.01 2.574 0.03973
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Table 4.8: USD/JPY GARCH(1,1) Parameter Estimates for 2004
Estimated Coefficients Value Std. Error t-Value Pr(> |t|)
C -0.03247 0.02968 -1.094 0.1373752
A 0.15177 0.05470 2.775 0.0029063
ARCH(1) 0.14566 0.04281 3.403 0.0003712
GARCH(1) 0.39701 0.18274 2.173 0.0152330
Information Criterion AIC(4) 625.9319 BIC(4) 641.5315
Normality Test
Jarque-Bera p-Value Shapiro-Wilk p-Value
26.53 0.0000017 0.9616 0.0000001328
Ljung-Box Test for Statistic p-Value Chi2 D.F.
Standardized Residuals 13.32 0.3465 12
Ljung-Box Test for Statistic p-Value Chi2 D.F.
(Standardized Residuals)2 24.53 0.01719 12
Lagrange Multiplier Test
Lag 1 Lag 2 Lag 3 Lag 4
1.381 0.2303 -1.867 -0.9272
Lag 5 Lag 6 Lag 7 Lag 8
2.47 1.835 0.8976 -0.5681
Lag 9 Lag 10 Lag 11 Lag 12
-2.163 0.03663 -0.3819 0.2463
C
-0.9574
TR2 p-Value f-Stat p-Value
22.77 0.02971 2.213 0.06876
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Tables 4.4 to 4.8 show that all models were correctly specified and are robust. This is evidenced,
amongst other statistics by (a1 + b1) < 1, Shapiro-Wilk > 0.95 and the normallity test having
very small p-values ( < 0.001), for all models. These tables also undertake Ljung-Box tests
for standardised residuals, squared standardised residuals, Lagrange Multiplier tests for various
lags. These tests further support the accuracy of the model parameter estimates.
4.3 MC GARCH Simulations
By applying MC simulation to these estimated GARCH models, one can derive sufficient out-
of-sample simulations to be able to generate the estimated distributions. These simulations can
also be used to determine whether the resulting models reflect the behaviour of the original time
series i.e. stress testing for model robustness.
To verify this and to generate sufficient distributions to be netted, 250 MC simulations were
generated at each point in time using random draws from a Gaussian 4 distribution. 250 MC
simulations per each of the five FX rates was determined to be a suitable number of simulation
runs without being either too few or too many. These are graphed using circle markers in Figure
4.21 and using line markers in Figure 4.22.
4Except for USD/EUR, in which the Student-t was used.
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Figure 4.21: 250 MC Simulations of FX GARCH(1,1) Models for 2005 Using Circle Markers
80
0 20000 40000 60000 80000
0.
00
8
0.
00
9
0.
01
0
0.
01
1
0.
01
2
0.
01
3
250 Simulations of USD/AUD GARCH(1,1) Model For 365 Days Out-Of-Sample
0 20000 40000 60000 80000
0.
00
6
0.
00
7
0.
00
8
0.
00
9
250 Simulations of USD/CAD GARCH(1,1) Model For 365 Days Out-Of-Sample
0 20000 40000 60000 80000
0.
00
3
0.
00
4
0.
00
5
0.
00
6
0.
00
7
0.
00
8
250 Simulations of USD/EUR GARCH(1,1) Model For 365 Days Out-Of-Sample
0 20000 40000 60000 80000
0.
00
20
0.
00
25
0.
00
30
0.
00
35
250 Simulations of USD/GBP GARCH(1,1) Model For 365 Days Out-Of-Sample
0 20000 40000 60000 80000
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
1.
2
1.
4
250 Simulations of USD/JPY GARCH(1,1) Model For 365 Days Out-Of-Sample
Figure 4.22: 250 MC Simulations of FX GARCH(1,1) Models for 2005 Using Line Markers
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Figure 4.21 and Figure 4.21 show that the MC simulations do not exhibit any anomalies that
would suggest that they were not representative of the original FX rate volatility. The circle
markers of Figure 4.21 have the advantage over the Figure 4.22 version as they make it easier to
distinguish the contribution of each simulation point by having less overlap. The line markers
of Figure 4.22 have the advantage over the 4.21 version as they are more narrower and it is
more obvious how they coincide with the volatility of Figure 4.11. This is most apparent with
USD/CAD and USD/JPY rates as they are more significantly bound from below, and so the
other three FX rates have less skew. Furthermore, all simulations emanate or evolve from a
certain point unique to each FX rate. These points are the last point of the daily differences
from 2004 (i.e. 31/12/2004). Figure 4.22 was then clarified by only showing the first 10 of the
250 simulations, together with the mean in bold red to produce Figure 4.23.
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Figure 4.23: First 10 MC Simulations of FX GARCH(1,1) Models + Mean (In Bold Red) for
2005
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The simulations in Figure 4.23 are well behaved and do not exhibit any anomalies, hence rein-
forcing our confidence in the MC approach adopted. Figure 4.23 was reproduced for the last
10 of the 250 simulations and is shown in Figure 4.24 to help validate whether Figure 4.23 was
representative of the true distributions.
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Figure 4.24 suggests that there is nothing obvious to argue that it behaves differently to the
simulations of Figure 4.23. To obtain a more rigorous measure of the mean and variance of these
simulations for more than 250 simulation runs, Figure 4.25 was graphed, showing the predicted
conditional standard deviation.
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Figure 4.25: FX GARCH(1,1) Predicted Conditional Standard Deviation for 2005
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Figure 4.25 shows the conversion rate and model behaviour for each of the FX GARCH(1,1)
models. The USD/AUD, USD/CAD and USD/EUR GARCH models all increase over time,
whilst USD/GBP and USD/JPY decrease over time. Some of these models converge at a much
faster rate than the others, namely the USD/CAD and the USD/JPY models. However, some
may think that the decline of the USD/GBP and USD/JPY models may imply that these
models are not performing as well as the others. This is not the case, and so the simulated
confidence interval of FX volatility was graphed in Figure 4.26 to provide a further measure of
the simulations’ variation.
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Figure 4.26: FX GARCH(1,1) Volatility MC Simulated Confidence Interval for 2005
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Figure 4.26 displays the nature of the GARCH(1,1) models’ predictions by showing the minima,
maxima and mean for the simulated volatility. Figure 4.26 more clearly shows that all five
models converge, especially by the 150th day out-of-smaple.
4.4 Application of Netting Model
We will examine the netting model applied to our 250 FX GARCH(1,1) volatility MC simula-
tions. Table 4.9 shows the first 10 daily data points for the first simulation run of our five FX
rates. This data formed one of the curves that was used for Figure 4.23.
Table 4.9: First 10 MC Simulations of FX GARCH(1,1) Models for 1st of 250 Simulation Runs
for 2005 in Business Notation
Simulation Day USD USD USD USD USD
Run Point /AUD /CAD /EUR /GBP /JPY
1 01-Jan-05 0.008874078 0.006291776 0.003637556 0.002370946 0.624975500
1 02-Jan-05 0.008811324 0.006120256 0.003607211 0.002354252 0.556023500
1 03-Jan-05 0.008771435 0.006188524 0.003587522 0.002342459 0.537590700
1 04-Jan-05 0.008711624 0.006126340 0.003558033 0.002326182 0.518152400
1 05-Jan-05 0.008656230 0.006137661 0.003530341 0.002310740 0.511602400
1 06-Jan-05 0.008737517 0.006521695 0.003567791 0.002325384 0.573256500
1 07-Jan-05 0.008710728 0.006215328 0.003554002 0.002316384 0.552231500
1 08-Jan-05 0.008654331 0.006130887 0.003525867 0.002300822 0.525426300
1 09-Jan-05 0.008649826 0.006279872 0.003522271 0.002296545 0.539993600
1 10-Jan-05 0.008871216 0.006931615 0.003626441 0.002342032 0.656065600
Using the netting notation of Chapter 3, Table 4.9 can be expressed in more generalised terms
as Table 4.10.
Table 4.10: First 10 MC Simulations of FX GARCH(1,1) Models for 1st of 250 Simulation Runs
for 2005 in Netting Notation
Simulation
t e1,1(t) e2,2(t) e3,3(t) e4,4(t) e5,5(t)Run
1 1 0.008874078 0.006291776 0.003637556 0.002370946 0.624975500
1 2 0.008811324 0.006120256 0.003607211 0.002354252 0.556023500
1 3 0.008771435 0.006188524 0.003587522 0.002342459 0.537590700
1 4 0.008711624 0.006126340 0.003558033 0.002326182 0.518152400
1 5 0.008656230 0.006137661 0.003530341 0.002310740 0.511602400
1 6 0.008737517 0.006521695 0.003567791 0.002325384 0.573256500
1 7 0.008710728 0.006215328 0.003554002 0.002316384 0.552231500
1 8 0.008654331 0.006130887 0.003525867 0.002300822 0.525426300
1 9 0.008649826 0.006279872 0.003522271 0.002296545 0.539993600
1 10 0.008871216 0.006931615 0.003626441 0.002342032 0.656065600
Table 4.10 lists the first simulation run in a more similar mathematical format. If we look at
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the first simulation run, for day 1 (i.e. for t=1), this will populate only the diagonals of the
netting matrix, i.e. ei,j(1) when i = j, but not when i 6= j, as shown in Equation 4.7.
E =

e1,1(1) e1,2(1) e1,3(1) e1,4(1) e1,5(1)
e2,1(1) e2,2(1) e2,3(1) e2,4(1) e2,5(1)
e3,1(1) e3,2(1) e3,3(1) e3,4(1) e3,5(1)
e4,1(1) e4,2(1) e4,3(1) e4,4(1) e4,5(1)
e5,1(1) e5,2(1) e5,3(1) e5,4(1) e5,5(1)

. (4.7)
So far, we know the values of e1,1(1), e1,2(1), e1,3(1), e1,4(1), e1,5(1) from Table 4.10, just its
first row. However, we notice from Equation 3.7 that ei,j(1) = 0 where i = j, as a bank does
not have an exposure with itself. We also attribute each bank’s simulated MC exposure to the
other four counterparty banks equally. Hence, Equation 4.7 can be expressed as Equation 4.8.
E =

0 e1,1(1)/4 e1,1(1)/4 e1,1(1)/4 e1,1(1)/4
e2,2(1)/4 0 e2,2(1)/4 e2,2(1)/4 e2,2(1)/4
e3,3(1)/4 e3,3(1)/4 0 e3,3(1)/4 e3,3(1)/4
e4,4(1)/4 e4,4(1)/4 e4,4(1)/4 0 e4,4(1)/4
e5,5(1)/4 e5,5(1)/4 e5,5(1)/4 e5,5(1)/4 0

. (4.8)
Again, notice that for i 6= j, ei,j(1) in Equation 4.7 maps to ei,i(1)/4 in Equation 4.8. This
is because this thesis has taken the approach of each bank being equally exposed to the other
banks. Since we are considering 5 banks in total, each bank is thus exposed equally amongst
the remaining 4 banks. Although such an approach may seem to some as somewhat naive, it is
actually deliberate as there is practically infinitely many arrangements between n banks. For
this extreme, as n increases, the number of arrangements grows exponentially which is not feasi-
ble. On the other extreme, just having only one arrangement is not feasible as it would produce
non-generalised conclusions. This then justifies our approach as the most natural arrangement
that avoids the pitfalls of the above two possible extremes.
Notice also the vertical line that separates columns 1 and 2 from the rest of the matrix. This
will become more apparent below, but it is present essentially to help simplify the notation and
to prevent the matrix from taking up more than a page of A4 paper. This lead to the nota-
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tion A1(1)...A12(1) and B1(1)...B12(1) to reduce the size of Equation 4.9 below. Consequently,
Equation 4.8 becomes Equation 4.9 when we substitute the values from Table 4.10 further below.
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From Equation 4.9, we can deduce the values for A1(1)...A12(1) as,
A1(1) = max{e1,1(1)/4− e3,3(1)/4, 0}
A2(1) = max{e1,1(1)/4− e4,4(1)/4, 0}
A3(1) = max{e1,1(1)/4− e5,5(1)/4, 0}
A4(1) = max{e2,2(1)/4− e3,3(1)/4, 0}
A5(1) = max{e2,2(1)/4− e4,4(1)/4, 0}
A6(1) = max{e2,2(1)/4− e5,5(1)/4, 0}
A7(1) = max{e3,3(1)/4− e4,4(1)/4, 0}
A8(1) = max{e3,3(1)/4− e5,5(1)/4, 0}
A9(1) = max{e4,4(1)/4− e3,3(1)/4, 0}
A10(1) = max{e4,4(1)/4− e5,5(1)/4, 0}
A11(1) = max{e5,5(1)/4− e3,3(1)/4, 0}
A12(1) = max{e5,5(1)/4− e4,4(1)/4, 0}.
and through Table B.10 we can deduce the values for B1(1)...B12(1) as,
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B1(1) = max{0.002218520− 0.000909389, 0}
= 0.001309131.
B2(1) = max{0.002218520− 0.000592737, 0}
= 0.001625783.
B3(1) = max{0.002218520− 0.156243875, 0}
= 0.
B4(1) = max{0.001572944− 0.000909389, 0}
= 0.000663555.
B5(1) = max{0.001572944− 0.000592737, 0}
= 0.000980207.
B6(1) = max{0.001572944− 0.156243875, 0}
= 0.
B7(1) = max{0.000909389− 0.000592737, 0}
= 0.
B8(1) = max{0.000909389− 0.156243875, 0}
= 0.000316652.
B9(1) = max{0.000592737− 0.000909389, 0}
= 0.
B10(1) = max{0.000592737− 0.156243875, 0}
= 0.155334486.
B11(1) = max{0.156243875− 0.000909389, 0}
= 0.155651138.
B12(1) = max{0.156243875− 0.000592737, 0}
= 0.
We now can apply the formula for a bank’s total exposure as seen in Appendix - Banks Total
Exposure to arrive at Equation 4.10 below.
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From Equation 4.10, we see that this is just for when t = 1, i.e. the first simulated day of
a total 365. When t = 2, we can calculate Equation 4.10 again, and so on until t = 365
(i.e. 31/12/2005). The result of applying this netting methodology for the MC GARCH(1,1)
simulated 2005 data is shown in Figure 4.27.
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Figure 4.27: First MC Simulation of FX GARCH(1,1) Models Netted for 2005 for 5 Banks
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Figure 4.27 shows that the FX rate exposures for all 5 hypothetical international banks both with
and without netting on the same graph. Notice that the exposures are significantly reduced due
to netting, except for USD/JPY. USD/JPY has actually had very little change, and USD/GBP
has had an exposure of zero so it is difficult to notice. Such a result is due to the magnitudes of
the FX rate exposures and their multivariate relation to the other FX rate exposures. Notice
also that netting is not a simple linear translation or shift function (i.e. N [e(t)] 6= e(t) − h for
some netting function N applied to some exposure e over time t cannot be expressed in terms
of some shift constant h). This observation is most obvious in the USD/EUR exposure.
To determine whether the result for USD/JPY was just an anomaly, an alternative arrange-
ment was established between the other 4 FX currencies, thus creating a system of 4 rates
rather than 5. This is shown in Figure 4.28.
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Figure 4.28: First MC Simulation of FX GARCH(1,1) Models Netted for 2005 for 4 Banks
Surprisingly, Figure 4.28 shows that the USD/GBP still has an exposure of zero after netting.
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This suggests that depending on the magnitudes of other FX exposures, one bank may always
be netted to zero. To see whether these results for 5 and 4 banks was present in only the
1st simulation run or over all 250 simulation runs, the resulting histograms together with their
density curves are plotted in Figure 4.29 and Figure 4.30.
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Figure 4.29: MC Simulation Distribution of 250 FX GARCH(1,1) Models Netted for 2005 for 5
Banks
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Figure 4.30: MC Simulation Distribution of 250 FX GARCH(1,1) Models Netted for 2005 for 4
Banks
From Figures 4.29 and 4.30, we see that from all distributions, netting has reduced their mean
and variance. We also see that the results for 1 simulation run above were consistent with 250
simulation runs. For the cases where there is very little change or a significant reduction to
zero, such a pattern is difficult to notice or visually deduce, hence the use of arrows to point to
the resulting distribution. To determine whether these differences were statistically significant,
a Two Sample t-Test was carried out for each of the five FX rates, as shown in Table 4.11.
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The Two Sample Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Test of Table 4.12 is further evidence that except for
USD/JPY, netting has produced a statitically significant impact on Bank’s FX derivatives and
their corresponding portfolio.
In summary, this chapter has analysed the FX rate time series data and determined its charac-
teristics prior to modelling. These five datasets were then used to estimate five GARCH models
using the normal distribution. One model required a departure from the normal distribution
-namely the Student-t distribution. The model parameters were examined for suitability by
performing a number of goodness-of-fit tests. The models were then simulated to produce the
non-netted FX time series data. Then the netting model was applied to this data to produce the
netted FX time series data. The results were compared to estimate the impact due to close-out
netting.
In preparation for the concluding chapter, it is useful to review the results through one of
three following possible risks within the findings;
1. If coefficients are not significant, they should be eliminated.
2. If evidence is contradictory, it needs full discussion.
3. If the model is inappropriate, then this cannot be ignored.
Each of these possible issues and their recommended approach has been considered, and based
on the qualitative and quantitative results, the models specified are accurate and appropriate.
For a more detailed discussion of these results, we refer the reader to the Conclusions chapter
below.
104
Chapter 5
Conclusions
This chapter finalises the research by summarising and addressing the results. We also propose
areas for further research which are beyond the scope of this research.
5.1 Concluding the Results
The purpose of this thesis was to model and determine the mechanics of close-out netting. The
research question is “What is the nature of close-out netting on bank portfolios?” From a high-
level overview perspective, close-out netting is just a simple process of taking the difference
between two counterparty exposure amounts. However, it is the stochastic volatility of daily
FX rates and the multivariate nature of inter-bank netting that makes the purpose of this thesis
much more difficult to research.
To address these issues, a modelling environment was established to measure the impact of
close-out netting by incorporating the FX rates of five main currencies; USD/AUD, USD/CAD,
USD/EUR, USD/GBP and USD/JPY. A banking context was chosen to have a more practical
framework under which close-out netting is typically applied.
To realistically reproduce this environment, five GARCH(1,1) models were derived using ac-
tual FX rate data for one year and simulated out of sample, also for one year. Tests were
then carried out on the resulting distributions to determine convergence, frequency, normality,
closeness-of-fit to the distributions and other statistical metrics. Close-out netting was applied
using a carefully specified netting framework or methodology. To ensure that the resulting net-
ted time-series were not anomalies, the same process was repeated 250 times via MC simulation.
A number of further statistical tests were applied to ensure the significance of the resulting im-
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pact of close-out netting. These analyses showed that the results were not simulation anomalies
but were consistent and robust.
Close-out netting was found to have a statistically significant impact on a portfolio of bank
FX derivatives for all chosen FX rates except USD/JPY. This was found using a Two Sample
t-Test. This initial result may be of no surprise, since taking the difference of two numbers is a
significant process or result in itself. However, it is the value of this thesis to demonstrate that
netting is far from a simple process by examining the nature of this exposure reduction. The
fact that some FX currencies or banks may not necessarily be impacted in significant terms by
netting has certainly not been widely documented in the literature.
Even this result is lined with certain caveats. Firstly, the techniques used to compare the dis-
tributions before and after netting assume one is comparing two Gaussian distributions, more
particularly if the data sets are small. However, the netted distributions are not Gaussian;
ranging from bimodal, truncated and extremely low variance distributions. To overcome the
problems with the t-Test, the Signed Rank Two-Sample Wilcoxon Test was adopted, as such
a test makes no assumptions about the nature of the two distributions. The results for this
test essentially show that netting still has a significant impact, except for USD/JPY which is
counter-intuitive. However, these Wilcoxon results were found to have less certainty than the
t-Test results. We are compelled to conclude that there is no simple formula that can calcu-
late how much exposure can be reduced by netting. The reason for this complexity lies not
only in the stochastic volatility of daily FX rates, but also in the resulting multivariate nature
of bilateral netting arrangements between multiple banks and the relative magnitude of these
amounts. The netting formulas in Chapter 3 - Modelling Methodology and Appendix A
- Additional theoretical results capture this complexity.
Emmons (1995) also pointed out that a system of banks would ultimately achieve zero credit
risk if all deals are netted off due to a “sufficiently large number” of banks offsetting each other.
Emmons pointed out that such a number may be as small as 100 banks. This thesis’ use of first
5 banks and then 4 banks suggests that the convergence observed may stabilise with far fewer
banks than 100, say 20.
So far, these results have focussed on answering just the question of “how much” exposure
is reduced by netting. We can now address more of the “how”. The modelling showed, through
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rigorous simulation, that close-out netting was more impacted by some currencies than other
currencies. This is a finding that is not so widely known and lead to the proposal of the MIN-
NET Principal after MINimum NETting. Essentially this states that the amount of netting
that occurs between any two counterparties is inversely proportional to the difference in pre-
netted exposure amounts. To further explain this phenomenon, consider the schematic example
in Figure 5.1 where two bank counterparties 1 exposures are close-out netted in the two most
common scenarios.
1One of these counterparties is referred to as “A Bank” to highlight that the calculations have been measured
with reference to that bank counterparty.
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Figure 5.1: Schematic Example of Close-out Netting When the Exposures are Far Appart, and
When they are Close Together
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In Figure 5.1, a maximum exposure is set at $1,000 and the minimum at $0 with a mid-
point of $500. This is just to define simple reference points. Notice that in the first diagram,
$800 − $50 = $750 which is not too far from the mid-point, however in the second diagram,
$800− $750 = $50 which is far from the mid-point. This implies that depending on the magni-
tudes of the credit exposures of the counterparties that are close-out netting, then the maximum
impact to the Bank due to close-out netting is observed at the minimum counterparty exposures.
The MINNET Principal
Maximum Portfolio Impact ∝ 1Minimum Counterparty Exposure . (5.1)
It was demonstrated from the simulated distributions that close-out netting significantly reduced
the mean -which is obvious. Although not present in these distributions, for certain currencies,
close-out netting can significantly increase the variance -which is not so obvious (Bech, Madsen
and Natrop, 2002). This implies that under certain conditions such as portfolio re-investment,
close-out netting can increase the volatility of the bank’s own portfolio. This occasional in-
crease in variance means that banking and finance professionals that have implemented netting
should now monitor their portfolio exposures and volatility more closely to be able to determine
whether they are being exposed to greater levels of liquidity risk than expected. Such a peculiar
disadvantage of netting is best expressed as “risk transfer”. By this we mean that banks that
are not heavily netted can have a significant disadvantage over other banks that are heavily
netted, in that such banks have effectively absorbed or shouldered much of their counterparty’s
credit risk. Such an event would also be determined by the combined overall simultaneous effect
of the stochastic volatility of daily FX rates at some point(s) in time.
Another effect of netting is that a certain amount of information about the portfolio expo-
sure is lost due to its subtractive characteristics. This has a similar effect as when accountants
aggregate low-level figures into high-level subtotals and totals. If the low-level figures are lost,
then it is either very difficult or even impossible to drill down from these high-level figures. This
is because as a bank nets off its portfolio against its counterparties, it introduces multivariate
complexities into the portfolio that make it difficult for one to forecast future trends. Although
it wasn’t present in these results, netting can cause sudden reduction spikes or drops in the
exposures down to zero. These structural breaks make it much more complex to model using
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conventional techniques. Despite these netting difficulties, it is a small disadvantage compared
to the overall reduction in exposure to credit default risk.
5.2 Addressing Possible Accounting Issues
The following issues have been identified as being concerns that either accountants may have or
that the general public may have over the introduction of close-out netting and its impact.
• How Does Close-out Netting Relate to Contra and Offset Entries in Account-
ing?
To answer this question, a definition of a contra account is provided.
Definition 7.1 (Contra-Account)
A account that accumulates data and that is deducted/offset/netted against some other ac-
count. Furthermore, contra accounts can be in separate firms which can offset each other,
such as when two entities are both debtors and creditors to each other (CCH Macquarie,
1990).
In light of this, close-out netting can be implemented in accounting systems by using
contra accounts and offsetting or netting them as required.
• Could Portfolio Reinvestment due to Close-out Netting be Considered as a
Form of Market Manipulation?
Portfolio reinvestment due to close-out netting could be negatively seen by certain investors
as market manipulation by a bank to make its share price seem higher than its true
value, as its credit default risk is minimised. Although such portfolio reinvestment is
actually beneficial to the corresponding counter-party, its shareholders and its customers,
unfortunately people’s perceptions usually become their reality. This possible negative
perception may lead some investors to contribute to a drop in share price. So long as the
benefits of close-out netting are explained to these parties, then they should dispel such
concerns.
• Would Close-out Netting be Unfairly Applicable to Only Certain Banks?
Firstly, close-out netting is available to any financial institution that lends and borrows
money. It is not cost prohibitive or exclusive. Although the larger banks are better
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equipped to implement close-out netting due to having larger legal and computing depart-
ments, the smaller banks can still enjoy the benefits of close-out netting. As mentioned
above, it is in the best interests of all bank counterparties to close-out net. The fact
that the larger banks will have more money that can be close-out netted is just a natural
consequence of larger companies having greater economies of scale.
• What, if any, are the Tax Implications of Close-out Netting?
Due to close-out netting’s relatively recent introduction, the Australian Taxation Office
(ATO) has not yet released any new policies for the taxation of money freed up by close-
out netting. The ATO is unlikely to tax close-out netted amounts because these are
not genuine forms of income. However, governments can change their stances and the
ATO could introduce a new tax on either the amount of money in capital reserves freed
up by close-out netting or on portfolio reinvestment profits enabled by close-out netting.
Furthermore, such a tax would effectively be taxing corporations at least three times; the
first time when the asset is generated, the second when it is close-out netted, and the
third when it is realised or liquidated. Nevertheless, due to the credit risk reduction and
leveraging or gearing benefits of close-out netted amounts, even such a tax could still be
worthwhile paying.
• Does Close-out Netting Reduce Investor Confidence in Banks?
As close-out netting frees up amounts of money in capital adequacy accounts and is rein-
vested, this can potentially increase the credit exposure risk within bank portfolios, and
in particular market risk. If anything, there may be a risk of bad publicity over close-out
netting if it can ever be given a negative bias. This risk though, is negligible given that
banks that adopt close-out netting receive better reviews for the components that make
up their overall credit risk rating. Although close-out alone is not usually enough to raise
a bank’s credit risk rating, it certainly is heavily encouraged by the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS) in its Basel Pillar I and II reforms (Basel Committee, 2001). This in
turn can only increase investor confidence.
5.3 Further Research
Close-out netting is an interesting and rich source of new research that can be studied further
and enhanced in many directions. The following selected enhancements should uncover further
truths about close-out netting that cannot be adequately addressed in this thesis.
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5.3.1 Determining the Relationship Between Close-out Netting and Capital
Adequacy
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) allows a bank’s capital adequacy reserves to be
reduced so long as it reduces its credit risk exposure, such as by using close-out netting. Just
to what extent a bank should lower these reserves depends on the amount close-out netted.
To determine the exact relationship between levels of close-out netting and levels of capital
reserves is a complex task because one would have to further analyse what was happening to
the portfolio at least at the asset group level during close-out netting. A portfolio VaR with and
without netting would need to be formulated and estimated before a relationship could be found
with capital adequacy. The stochastic volatility of FX rates would force the calculations to be
processed over time series data to determine convergence, drift and other stochastic metrics.
5.3.2 Collateralisation Under Uncertainty
Relatively recently in mid 2003, Australian banks began taking the next step forward after the
full implementation of close-out netting, i.e. collateralisation 2. It is one thing to be able to
close-out net contracts and record them as if the counterparty was bankrupt. To go the next
step further though, and collateralise one’s assets against one’s counterparty’s assets makes
close-out netting all the more worthwhile. How this begins to become complex is that a bank is
willing to only collateralise some of its portfolio contracts with only some of their counter-parties
portfolio contracts. This is not to mention that at a higher level, certain asset groups are cross-
collateralised 3 with other asset groups. The more cross-collateralisation the better, as there are
more assets to seize in the case of default. Care must be taken though not to count these assets
more than once, otherwise the benefits of netting may be overstated. These refinements would
significantly expand the required simulation space and the scope of this research.
5.3.3 Incrementally Increasing the Number of Counterparties
One could begin by further analysing the effects of close-out netting on not just five counter-
parties but incrementally up to say the world’s top one hundred banks. This would enable one
to see more clearly the underlying mechanics of close-out netting in relation to the increasing
number of counterparties, especially when various convergence patterns emerge. This form of
2Collateralisation can be defined as “Assets pledged by a borrower to secure a loan or other credit, and subject
to seizure in the event of default, and is also known as security” (www.InvestorWords.com).
3Cross-collateralisation can be defined as “When collateral for one loan is also serving as collateral for other
loans” (www.InvestorWords.com).
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further research would begin by utilising six banks, then seven and so on. This thesis’ use of
five counterparties though is more than adequate to assess the nature of close-out netting.
5.3.4 Varying Portfolio Asset Group Concentrations
Yet another possible enhancement could be to determine whether close-out netting impacts are
sensitive to the weighting factors in a portfolio’s asset group concentration. This thesis has
assumed for simplicity and generality that the banks’ portfolios were composed of one asset
group that depends on FX rates (just the raw FX rate itself). If other asset groups were
introduced, each with varying reliance on FX rates, then a less theoretical approach could be
adopted which may lead to the isolation of various “netting thresholds”. Such thresholds would
be upper bounds for the benefits of close-out netting. A related area is that of asset group
correlations, measured by covariance matrices. Such an enhancement would appear to be easily
incorporated into the existing matrix netting notation.
5.3.5 Analysing Stages of Economic Cycles
Depending on what stage a bank may be throughout an economic cycle, banks would structure
their portfolios differently during a boom period than during a recession. The 2004 and 2005 FX
rate data input into the GARCH(1,1) models are taken from a period of relative international
growth. The difficulty in simulating over say, a 20 year period to ensure all stages of a cycle
are explored is that one would increasingly lose forecast accuracy over time. One approach for
further research could be to reproduce the results of this thesis for each of the four stages of an
economic cycle.
5.3.6 Enhancing Close-out Netting Research via Copulas
Whilst VaR is a reasonable measure of a portfolio’s exposure to credit default risk, it relies
heavily on correlations. Although most of the close-out netting data is distributed about a
relatively low risk mean, it is in the tail -which is skewed to the right -where most of the high
risk contracts lie. These types of datasets prevent conventional correlation methods from being
applied due to the uniqueness of these types of distributions and that most methods focus on
the bulk of the data and not on the few exceptions.
Embrechts, Lindskog et. al. (2001) have used copulas to model these correlations. The theory
of copulas is an abstract and powerful theory that looks at the similarities between different
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probability distributions by looking at their underlying components in an n-dimensional space.
Copulas are thus able to answer questions that are either very difficult or impossible to solve
using conventional techniques. The use of copulas would enable close-out netting research to
better compare the portfolio model distributions with and without close-out netting, in cases
where the distributions being compared are highly skewed. The resulting netted distributions
certainly are not standard. Such use of skewed distributions, in particular log-normal distribu-
tions in the context of Figure B.1, would extend and refine the existing research on close-out
netting.
5.3.7 Generating Quasi-Random Numbers for Quasi-Monte Carlo Simulation
We plot 500 pseudo-random numbers in Figure 5.2 as part of a Monte Carlo simulation.
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Figure 5.2: 500 R250 Normalised 2D-Plot Pairs (xn, xn+1) Plot
Taking a closer look at Figure 5.2, one can see that there are certain regions that have a much
greater concentration of points than in other regions. These concentrations are a property of
pseudo-random numbers that is not desirable for certain model simulations due to these numbers
not covering as much of the variation space. However, real-life distributions have these concen-
trations and so they shouldn’t automatically be eliminated from the modelling. One possible
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hypothesis may be that the minimisation of these concentrations may give rise to more robust
results.
If these concentrations need to be reduced for one’s simulations, then one available technique is
the use of quasi pseudo-random numbers, or just quasi-random numbers. Quasi-random num-
bers can extend this research on close-out netting by facilitating the creation of alternate models
that are not based on standard pseudo-random numbers.
For further details on quasi-random numbers, please refer to Appendix C - Further Quasi-
Random Number Details.
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Appendix A
Additional Theoretical Results
A.1 Example of Three Banks
Take three Banks x1, x2 and x3. Their exposures through bilateral netting agreements can be
shown schematically in Figure A.1.
x1
x3x2
Figure A.1: Exposures Between Three Banks
Suppose that in our three Bank example of Bank x1, Bank x2 and Bank x3, that at some point
in time t,
e1,2(t) = $50, 000, 000
e1,3(t) = $30, 000, 000
e2,1(t) = $20, 000, 000
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e2,3(t) = $40, 000, 000
e3,1(t) = $10, 000, 000
e3,2(t) = $60, 000, 000.
Following on from our netting formulation of Equation 3.7, the number of Banks n is n = 3,
giving,
Without Netting
E =


0 e1,2(t) e1,3(t)
e2,1(t) 0 e2,3(t)
e3,1(t) e3,2(t) 0


=

0 $50, 000, 000 $30, 000, 000
$20, 000, 000 0 $40, 000, 000
$10, 000, 000 $60, 000, 000 0
 .
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Hence, under netting, Bank x1 has reduced its exposure to Bank x2 down to $30, 000, 000 and
its exposure to Bank x3 down to $20, 000, 000. Bank x2 no longer has an exposure to Bank x1
nor Bank x2. Bank x3 no longer has an exposure to Bank x1 and has reduced its exposure to
Bank x2 down to $20, 000, 000.
A.2 Illustration of Four and Five Banks
By looking at Equation 3.7, we see that it is already generalised for n Banks. Although there is
not much point in repeating the example calculations for more than three Banks, it is at least
worthwhile illustrating the multivariate complexity and number of bilateral netting agreements
that exist between these number of banks. These have been illustrated in Figure A.2 and Figure
A.3 below.
x1
x3x2
x4
Figure A.2: Exposures Between Four Banks
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Figure A.3: Exposures Between Five Banks
It is also worthwhile noting that in general, the total number of bilateral netting contracts or
agreements between n banks is n(n−1)2 .
A.3 Vector-Sequence Notation
Vector-sequence notation allows matrices to be more concisely expressed as a sequence of vectors.
We can extend from the netting model by first mentioning that Equation 3.6 for the exposure
without netting can be expressed as,
E =
 {ei,j(t)}
n
i=1 , ∀i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}
0, ∀i = j, i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}
. (A.1)
Correspondingly, Equation 3.7 for the exposure with netting can be expressed as,
N(E) =

{
max {ei,j(t)− ei,j(t), 0}}ni=1 , ∀i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}
0, ∀i = j, i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}
. (A.2)
A.4 Bank’s Total Exposure
So far, the netted exposure matrix N(E) has calculated the exposure each Bank i has to Bank
j after netting. However, it is also useful to determine Bank i’s total exposure across all other
banks, both with and without netting. Another way of expressing this is to determine Bank i’s
multilateral exposure both with and without netting. We then define a Bank’s Total exposure
operator T (∗) for without netting in matrix notation as shown below,
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Without Netting
T (E) = T


0 e1,2(t) · · · · · · e1,n(t)
e2,1(t) 0
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . 0 en−1,n(t)
en,1(t) · · · · · · en,n−1(t) 0


=

0 e1,2(t) · · · · · · e1,n(t)
e2,1(t) 0
. . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . .
...
...
. . . 0 en−1,n(t)
en,1(t) · · · · · · en,n−1(t) 0


1
1
...
1
1

=

e1,2(t) + e1,3(t) + · · ·+ e1,n(t)
e2,1(t) + e2,3(t) + · · ·+ e2,n(t)
...
en−1,1(t) + en−1,2(t) + · · ·+ en−1,n−1(t)
en,1(t) + en,2(t) + · · ·+ en,n−1(t)

. (A.3)
We define a Bank’s Total Exposure with netting in matrix notation as shown below,
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Using the vector-sequence notation of Equation A.1 and Equation A.2, we can rewrite Equation
A.3 and Equation A.4 as follows,
Bank’s Total Exposure Without Netting in Vector-Sequence Notation
T (E) =

{∑n
j=1 ei,j(t)
}n
i=1
, ∀i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}
0, ∀i = j, i, j ∈ {1, ..., n} (A.5)
.
Bank’s Total Exposure With Netting in Vector-Sequence Notation
T (N(E)) =

{∑n
j=1max{ei,j(t)− ej,i(t), 0}
}n
i=1
, ∀i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}
0, ∀i = j, i, j ∈ {1, ..., n} (A.6)
.
A.5 Netting System’s Total Exposure
Finally, it is worthwhile to define a Netting System’s Total Exposure S(∗) as the sum of its
multilateral exposures, giving,
Netting System’s Total Exposure Without Netting in Vector-Sequence Notation
S (T (E)) =

∑n
i=1
[∑n
j=1 ei,j(t)
]
, ∀i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}
0, ∀i = j, i, j ∈ {1, ..., n} (A.7)
.
Netting System’s Total Exposure With Netting in Vector-Sequence Notation
S (T (N(E))) =

∑n
i=1
[∑n
j=1max{ei,j(t)− ej,i(t), 0}
]
, ∀i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}
0, ∀i = j, i, j ∈ {1, ..., n} (A.8)
.
This is useful because if one can measure a System’s total exposure, both with and without
netting, then one can determine whether or not netting has reduced that System’s total exposure,
and whether or not some Banks have had increased exposures due to netting.
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Appendix B
VaR
The most popular metric in the banking industry to measure a portfolio’s exposure to credit
default risk and market risk is the so-called Value at Risk (V aR). VaR is defined as an estimate
to a given degree of confidence of the amount of money that is at risk in a portfolio over a given
time horizon (Wilmott, 2000). It is customary to calculate V aR at the 95% level of confidence.
Suppose that tomorrow’s price P for a portfolio is a random variable. This price depends
upon a set of n random variables, specifically tomorrow’s values {Vi}ni=1 for a set of n port-
folio “risk factors”. Depending upon the portfolio, the risk factors might be variables such as
exchange rates, interest rates, commodity prices or equity prices. The portfolio contains m con-
tracts whose values tomorrow are denoted {Ci}mi=1. These contract values are each a function
Ck (V1, ..., Vn) of the risk factors. The “portfolio price function” describes P as a function of the
risk factors, P (V1, ..., Vn) =
∑
k Ck (V1, ..., Vn). The portfolio’s one-day profit or loss is denoted
by ∆P and is simply P minus today’s value for the portfolio. The portfolio’s V aR can thus also
be defined as the bound on a 95% confidence interval for ∆P and this can be expressed as the
solution to the following integral,
95% =
∫ ∞
−V aR
pd∆P, (B.1)
where p is the probability density function for ∆P (Holton, 1995).
In Equation B.1 we are not actually solving for the value of the integral. We know the value
must be 95%. Instead, we are solving for the value V aR that makes it 95%. Depending on
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the type of distribution, if no closed form solution exists for Equation B.1, one would typically
consider numerical methods of integration. Examples of these methods include quadrature and
MC simulation. In doing so, we face a problem called “the curse of dimensionality”. This
arises because although Equation B.1 is presented as a one-dimensional integral, it is in fact an
n-dimensional integral, as both p and ∆P are functions of the n risk factors {Vi}ni=1. Since a
bank’s portfolio assets are not normally distributed, but skewed to the left, as shown in Figure
B.1 (Ieda et. al., 2000), the exercise of determining V aR becomes more complex.
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Figure B.1: Conceptual Diagram of the Density Function of a Typical Bank’s Loss Distribution.
Figure B.1 shows how a typical bank’s portfolio loss distribution is skewed to the right, indicating
that the bank is more risk averse by avoiding as many high credit risk assets as possible. The
lognormal is an example of such a distribution. The simulated distributions that VaR will be
calculated for will be best researched by the adoption of a netting model. Parameters, constants
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and variables can then be fixed and set according to one’s netting research objectives.
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Appendix C
Further Quasi-Random Number
Details
Rosen (2000) and separately Dembo et. al. (2000) have applied quasi-random numbers for the
MC simulation of credit risk. Quasi-random numbers are generated by constructing numbers
that are as far apart or ‘maximally self avoiding’ as possible. Whilst quasi-random numbers were
originally developed for numerical integration where the object one is measuring is unknown
or too complex to model, they have been shown to give superior results in certain financial
applications (Lemieux and L’Ecuyer, 2001). Consequently, there are many advantages and
disadvantages in using MC versus Quasi-MC Simulation, and these are summarised in Table C.1.
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Table C.1: The Advantages and Disadvantages of Monte Carlo and Quasi-Monte Carlo Simula-
tion (Algorithmics, 2000).
SIMULATION APPROACH MONTE CARLO QUASI-MONTE CARLO
• Generally applicable to all • Thoroughly tested and
problems validated
• Rate of convergence is • Based on sampling techniques
independent of that generate points evenly
ADVANTAGES the dimensionality of the within the region and avoid
risk factor space clustering
• Widely used and their
properties are well known
• Pseudo-random number • Lack of generality when
generators used tend to compared to Monte Carlo
generate clustering about methods means that their
points effectiveness may be largely
dependent on the problem,
and extensive testing is
required
• Do not explicitly exploit • Do not yield probabilistic
DISADVANTAGES particular features of the errors or ‘a priori’
problem bounds on VaR estimates
• Rate of convergence is slow • Rate of convergence depends
on the dimensionality of the
risk space
• May be inefficient for
problems of very large
dimensions
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Quasi-Random Numbers are part of a more general collection of numbers called Low Discrep-
ancy Sequences (LDS). Examples of these sequences together with their year of first publication
include; Halton Sequences (1960), Sobol Sequences (1967), Faure Sequences (1982), Haselgrove
Sequences (1961), and Hammersley Sequences (1961).
The Halton sequences are by far the simplest of these quasi-random numbers. From a high
level overview perspective, they seem to behave better than the pseudo-random numbers, as
seen by comparing the (xn, xn+1) plots in Figure C.1 below.
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Figure C.1: 500 MATLAB (R250) Pseudo-Random and 500 Halton Quasi-Random Numbers in
a (xn, xn+1) Plot or Marsaglia Plot
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For every plot pairs point (xn, xn+1) in Figure C.1, xn was determined using a Halton sequence
of base 2, and xn+1 was determined using a Halton sequence of base 3. In general, xn+i in
(xn, ..., xn+i) is generated using a Halton sequence of base i + 2. Typically, when one analyses
these numbers in higher dimensions, say in a (xn, xn+1, xn+2) Plot or a 3-Dimensional Marsaglia
Plot, one still finds that they do not exhibit excessive clustering. A particular implementation
of a Halton Sequence algorithm was trialled for this research, and shows excessive banding along
planes, as in Figure C.2.
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Figure C.2: 500 Halton Quasi-Random Numbers of Figure C.1 in a (xn, xn+1, xn+2) Plot
For this reason of banding and due to the scope restrictions of this thesis, it was decided not to
pursue quasi-random numbers any further. However, in a larger scale of research, an appropriate
set of quasi-random numbers would be found that supports the work of Rosen (2000), i.e. that
for certain financial simulations, quasi-random numbers produce more accurate results than
using pseudo-random numbers.
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